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“The beginning of knowledge is the discovery of something we do not understand." 
-- Frank Herbert  
A. HYPOTHESIS  
The information assurance domain at the organizational level is a dynamic, highly 
connected social and technical system.  Modeling this domain as a multi-agent system 
can capture all of the key elements and interactions in the domain.  Implementing this 
model as a software system can generate validatable hypotheses of the IA domain. 
B. INTRODUCTION 
Information Assurance (IA) is concerned with protecting and defending 
information and information systems [NSTISSC, 2000]1.  The field is complex and deals 
with highly interconnected social and technical components.  In an attempt to understand 
and explain portions of the domain, researchers have developed various security models 
and simulations.  While sufficient for the purpose for which they were designed, these 
tools provide limited utility for researchers to infer general conclusions at the 
organizational level. 
The environment of IA is too complex and dynamic to be understood with our 
present tools.  While IA researchers and security analysts may understand the individual 
mechanisms at a particular moment, the interactions that take place among the 
mechanisms, combined with the constantly evolving components themselves make 
understanding the entire system nearly impossible.  Researchers do not have a 
computational model suitable for simulation of the domain that includes the numerous 
actors, objects, processes and interactions in the environment.  Instead, analysts are 
                                                          
1  Many terms used in the fields of information assurance and agent-based 
systems are ambiguous or defined in multiple ways. A glossary is provided at the end of 
this dissertation that defines the key terms used in this work. 
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forced to focus on pieces of the problem without being able to envision the global 
environment within which they are working. 
This dissertation introduces a computational model of the IA domain.  The model 
proposes, at a high level of functional abstraction, the actors, objects, and processes that 
interact in the IA domain.  An extensible multi-agent simulation (MAS) is provided as an 
implementation of that model.  To implement this model as a computational simulation, 
various innovations in multi-agent simulations are introduced.  This computational model 
and simulation demonstrate how complex societies of highly interactive, autonomous 
actors and systems can combine and the security implications resulting from their 
interactions and combinations. 
This dissertation also presents a graphical and mathematical notation for 
expressing the IA issues of an organization.  While this notation can present the 
instantaneous issues at a point in time, its true benefit is to view the IA issues of an 
organization as they evolve.  These graphical and mathematical notations permit IA 
analysts to view the dynamic nature of IA in an organization.  
C. MOTIVATION 
1.   Complex Adaptive Systems, Agents, and Multi-Agent Simulations  
The purpose of simulations is to facilitate scientific study of complex systems.  A 
model is an abstraction of real world objects and processes that captures key aspects in 
the system under investigation.  A simulation is an implementation of the model.  Models 
and simulations permit researchers to investigate real-world systems and perform 
experiments that are not possible in the real systems [Law and Kelton, 2000].   
If the relationships among the objects and processes in the system are relatively 
simple, then mathematics may provide an analytical solution.  For domains that are more 
complex, a simulation can be used to provide insight into the model and real-world 
system [Law and Kelton, 2000]. 
Some real-world environments are complex adaptive systems (CAS), systems 
involving nonlinear relationships among large numbers of highly connected, interacting, 
adaptable entities.  Due to the complexity of these systems, mathematical tools and 
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traditional simulations often cannot accurately represent these domains.  Artificial 
complex adaptive systems (ACAS), composed of autonomous, interactive software 
agents are more capable for simulating such complex systems [Axelrod, 1997], [Holland, 
1996].  This work applies these capabilities to the field of IA. 
2.  Multi-Agent Simulation of Information Assurance 
IA is concerned with “…protect(ing) and defend(ing) information and 
information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation” [NSTISSC, 2000].  The overall system is not 
restricted to technological components.  A system is “a collection of entities, e.g., people 
or (and) machines, that act and interact together towards accomplishment of some logical 
end.”  [Law and Kelton, 2000].  Clearly, IA includes human actors that interact within 
this system, and any simulation that claims to model IA at the organizational level must 
include human aspects of the problem. 
IA deals with adaptable humans and computational devices that are 
interconnected through webs of communications networks.  Software and devices adapt 
through human interaction or autonomously to perform tasks.  Humans adapt themselves, 
communication links, devices, and the software running on those devices, sometime 
unknowingly, to better achieve their goals.  The domain is a interconnected, dynamic 
environment, where changes in one part of the environment can have cascading effects in 
other parts.  For example: requiring long, complex passwords composed of alphanumeric 
and non-alphanumeric characters may cause legitimate system users to write passwords 
down and place them in unsecured locations, such as yellow sticky labels posted on a 
computer monitor or under a desk pad.  The requirement for long passwords may reduce 
the threat of an attacker guessing a password, but may increase the threat of an insider 
finding and using the password, in effect mitigating the security enhancement that the 
long password was originally meant to achieve.  
The developed architecture provides an environment where investigators can 
conduct research and gain insight into the area of IA.  By developing a virtual IA 
laboratory, IA researchers can develop and view an abstraction of the domain, ask and 
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answer questions via MAS experiments and gain insight into actual strengths and 
vulnerabilities. 
D. APPROACH 
 A generalized computational model of the IA domain was developed through 
study of previous models, simulations, and observations of trends in the IA field.  A 
multi-agent simulation (MAS) has been developed that is an implementation of this 
model.  The MAS was tested on various scenarios, and the output compared with real-
world results.  The results show that it is possible to simulate the IA domain as a CAS. 
While an implementation may be configured to confirm or deny a hypothesis, the 
true power of the system is in its ability to discover patterns, providing insight into the 
possible evolutionary patterns of the environment, which can then be carefully confirmed 
or denied in the real world. 
A validation of this model is provided by mapping the elements of an empirically 
based model of IA to this research.  Additionally, a multi-agent simulation of this model 
was developed.  The scenarios implemented were compared with results in the real 
world. 
E. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS WORK 
This dissertation provides a fundamental new approach to examine IA issues at 
the organizational level.  This dissertation provides the following fundamental 
new contributions:  
• A formal mathematical and graphical language for representing the 
entities and their interactions in organizational modeling of IA. 
• An abstract computational model providing a mathematical depiction of 
the social and technical aspects of the actors, objects, and processes in the 
IA domain, and how these components interact. 
• A descriptive model providing a graphical notation and semantics for 
depicting and visualizing IA environments. 




• An extension of existing works on connectors, including both intra-agent 
and inter-agent communications, providing not only lightweight 
communication mechanisms, but also a graphical notation for visualizing 
communications among entities.  
• An implementation of an innovative composite-agent architecture that 
takes advantage of the connector-based communications mechanism. 
F. DISSERTATION ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. 
• Chapter II provides the reader with background on existing models and 
simulations in the IA domain and multi-agent simulation systems. 
• Chapter III introduces a computational model of IA, presenting the model 
in formal mathematical notation and in the Unified Modeling Language 
[Booch et al., 1999]. 
• Chapter IV introduces iconnectors, a graphical notation to illustrate 
communications among entities and a data structure to implement 
connector-based systems.  The IA model presented in the previous chapter 
is presented using this connector notation. 
• Chapter V presents a Connector-Based Agent Architecture [Hiles et al., 
2001] that was implemented for simulating humans throughout the 
simulation. 
• Chapter VI provides an evaluation of the model, and discusses the 
advantage of this concurrent model over functional models of IA.   
• Chapter VII describes a proof of concept software implementation of the 
multi-agent IA computational model.   
• Chapter VIII discusses several scenarios that were implemented on the 
multi-agent software, and a corresponding analysis of the scenarios.  This 
is followed by general observations discovered in the implementation of 
the model and scenarios. 
• Chapter IX provides a discussion of future work, and conclusions. 
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• A glossary is provided for reader convenience. 
• Appendix A provides a listing of output from implemented scenarios. 
• Appendix B is a Unified Modeling Language (UML) Quick Reference, 




II. REVIEW OF RELATED WORK 
 
"...you don't just solve problems, you defend against threats.  If you study 
hard enough, you can understand a computer problem completely, 
because it's a matter of physics and electronics and software.  The threat 
comes from a human attacker, not a machine...Security is not a technical 
problem, it's a social issue.  If you treat it as a problem that can be solved 
by technological means, you leave yourself open for an attack."  
-- Thomas Wadlow, The Process of Network Security 
A.   INTRODUCTION  
This chapter provides an introduction to the information assurance (IA) domain, 
discusses challenges in modeling and simulating this domain, and presents previous 
models and simulations that have been developed.  It then introduces alternative 
technologies available to simulation developers and discusses why multi-agent systems 
(MAS) are the best tool for modeling IA at the organizational level.  Finally, it discusses 
the use of the Unified Modeling Language (UML) in this dissertation. 
B.   INFORMATION ASSURANCE 
Information Assurance (IA) is concerned with “…protect(ing) and defend(ing) 
information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, 
authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation” [NSTISSC, 2000].  This dissertation 
is primarily concerned with the issues of availability, confidentiality, and integrity of the 
information and information systems at the organizational level.  These three 
characteristics of IA are defined in [NSTISSC, 2000] as: 
• availability: “Timely, reliable access to data and information services,” 
• confidentiality: “Assurance that information is not disclosed to 
unauthorized persons, processes or devices,” 
• integrity: “…protection against unauthorized modification or destruction 
of data (and processes).” 
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These three characteristics are not independent, and may overlap and even 
conflict with one another.  For example, strong confidentiality may adversely affect 
availability [Pfleeger, 1997]. 
C.  MODELS AND SIMULATIONS OF INFORMATION ASSURANCE 
1. Theoretical Models 
Theoretical models are developed to help understand a complex system under 
investigation.  Several researchers have attempted to create theoretical models of the IA 
field to help explain the environment.  Modeling the entire domain is a vast undertaking, 
and “a comprehensive taxonomy in the field of computer security has been a relatively 
intractable problem” [Amoroso, 1994]. 
Numerous formal models have been developed to demonstrate various security 
principles.  Bell and La Padula developed a Confidentiality Model to formally describe 
the Department of Defense Multilevel Security Policy, showing in abstract terms the 
authorized flows of information in secure systems [Bell and LaPadula, 1973].  This 
model uses formal mathematical notation to describe which actors and processes can read 
and write to an object in an abstract operating system.  
The Biba Integrity Model [Biba, 1977] is based on the observation that the Bell 
and LaPadula model was only developed to deal with unauthorized disclosure of 
information.  Biba examined the unauthorized modification of data, but ignored secrecy.  
Researchers are attempting to combine the security and integrity policies to form a more 
complete model. 
 Graham and Denning developed a formal model of protection that consisted of 
subjects, objects, rights, and an access control matrix [Graham and Denning, 1972].  This 
model provided the foundation for later models.  The Harrison, Ruzzo and Ullman model 
[Harrison et al., 1976], based on the Graham-Denning model, proved a fundamental 
limitation of automated examination of computer security systems.  This model proved 
that “…it is not always decidable whether a given protection system can confer a given 
right” [Harrison et al., 1976].  This conclusion implies that there is no algorithm that can 
prove that an arbitrary operating system will provide an arbitrary access to an arbitrary 
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data object.  A system can be designed such that the access to information is decidable 
(every command of the operating system must be an atomic operation), but these systems 
may be restricted in functionality.   
These formal state models are used to specify system protection behavior, such as 
access control or the prevention of information leakage.  They model a policy, and a 
system implements that policy or it does not.  While these models are helpful in 
understanding disclosure and modification of information in formal systems, they have 
limited utility in comprehensively modeling the entire domain of IA.   
2. Empirical Models 
Howard's dissertation was an analysis of Internet incidents from the Computer 
Emergency Response Team at Carnegie Mellon over the period 1989 to 1995 [Howard, 
1997].  The model was based on data collected on Internet security incidents, and 
provides a useful first step in illustrating attacker intent, tools, and effects.   
Howard and Longstaff updated Howard’s model, providing additional coverage of 
security incidents based on their experience in the security field [Howard and Longstaff, 
1998].  The model includes categories of attackers, tools, vulnerabilities, actions, targets, 
results, and attacker objectives. This model, based on empirical data and experience, is 
very useful for categorizing security incidents, and is discussed in detail in Chapter VI. 
Building upon his foundational analysis of intentional and accidental misuse 
techniques [Neumann and Parker, 1989], Neumann [1995] provides a comprehensive 
discussion of the threats, vulnerabilities, and risks to computer systems based on data 
collected from 1976 to 1995.  Neumann’s analysis is more comprehensive than 
Howard’s, including such categories as interpersonal attacks, accidents, and ignorance in 
his discussion of risks to computer systems.  While he doesn’t provide an overall model, 
he does provide a wealth of information upon which others may base their models. 
Amoroso developed a cost-effects matrix [Amoroso, 1994] describing actors and 
possible actions, but not their reasoning.  Landwehr's model [Landwehr et al., 1994] is a 
partial classification of possible attack “mechanisms” that lacks details such as attacker's 
goals and possible countermeasures that defenders may employ.  See [Cohen 2000] for a 
detailed discussion of these models. 
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3. Computational Models 
The purpose of a computational model is to describe a domain with sufficient 
expressive detail that a computational simulation can be built based on the model.  The 
simulation can provide insight into the field being investigated and verify the model.   
a. Rowe and Schiavo 
Rowe and Schiavo created a simulation to generate plans for software 
representations of legitimate users and cyber attackers as a component to an automated 
intrusion detection tutorial system [Rowe and Schiavo, 1998].  This planning tool used a 
modified means-ends analysis [Newell and Simon, 1972] to generate plans for entities to 
achieve goals.  The simulation was a multi-agent system, with each entity in the 
simulation an autonomous software entity.  The individual agents used a top-down 
planning approach to define the actor’s plans and actions.  Additionally, the system took 
into consideration time and probabilities, creating a realistic simulation of attacker and 
user behavior in simulated system logs.  While the system produced realistic, intelligent 
behavior, it suffered from the same problems as all top-down rule-base systems; the 
engineer must predefine the rules, based on a belief that actors behave in a certain way.  
This reliance on predefined behaviors prohibits the agent from discovering innovative 
ways to deal with unforeseen situations.  The strengths and weaknesses of rule-based 
systems are discussed in more detail in Section D. 
b. Liu, Yu, and Mylopoulos 
Liu et al. [2002] used the i* intentional framework [Yu, 1997] to analyze 
security requirements as a social system.  The framework depicts an environment under 
investigation as a dependency graph among “actors” and their goals, providing a means 
to analyze multiple actors and the intentional dependencies between them.  By examining 
the dependencies between supporting and conflicting actor goals, analysts are able to 
determine potential threats to systems. 
The i* model focuses entirely on strategic relationships among actors.  
System vulnerabilities and exploits are generated “ad hoc” as a specific case and placed 
manually in the model.  The i* model explores the relationships between actors at the 
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intentional level.  As such, this framework allows analysts to determine “why” an actor 
chooses a course of action that may lead to a compromise.   
First, detailed technical requirements are not modeled in the i* model, 
since Lie is interested in the relationships among actors and not the technical 
specifications of the system.  Secondly, this dissertation is interested in modeling 
behavior, and not intention.  It is interested in “how” a series of events may lead to a 
compromise.  While this dissertation is not interested in cognitive modeling, the graphical 
nature of i* may provide a useful means to depict actor roles, goals, and actions in later 
work. 
c. Cohen 
Cohen provided the first detailed computational model and simulation for 
"simulating cyber attacks, defenses and consequences” [Cohen, 2000].  This simulation 
consisted of a database of 37 threat mechanisms, 94 attack mechanisms, and 140 
protection mechanisms along with how these mechanisms are related and their effects.  
The database was used as input into a discrete event simulation.  The simulator was run 
repeatedly and the output was statistically analyzed.  In Cohen’s model the “actors” were 
simple translation tables.  Successfully accessing a node in a network resulted in the 
attacker being able to “pass through that node.”  Success for an attacker was defined as 
gaining access to a specific important node.  It was not possible to show that a node was 
offline or disabled.  Additionally, it was not possible to show interim benefits of 
compromising hosts.  One such benefit is access to data files that can provide the attacker 
with additional useful information.  Another benefit of penetrating a host is the additional 
computational capacity of the compromised host, for example, in a denial of service 
attack or a distributed brute force password-cracking scheme. While this simulation was 
an important first step, the system lacked actor adaptability as found in evolutionary 
social systems involving humans.  Additionally the simulation does not permit multiple 
attackers or collaborating defenders, a necessity in simulations of a highly social yet 
adversarial environment like IA.  
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4. Miscellaneous Models 
The following models and systems are various attempts to model components of 
the IA domain and develop computational systems based on these models.  They are 
included to show various other techniques used to model components of the environment. 
(a) Immunology Models 
Forrest et al. [1996] developed a limited security model based on the 
natural immune system.  She developed a limited intrusion-detection system that 
performed in a manner similar to the animal immune systems response to intrusions by 
disease.  Her original solution to the problem led to promising results.  Her work to 
model a technical system as a biological system was limited to monitoring privileged 
system calls, but the idea of modeling security as a biological system provides insight 
into developing other biological based systems. 
(b) Information Warfare (IW) Models 
Anderson [1998] examined risk assessment in the IW domain, attempting 
to model actual human threat actors in specific situations in order to apply resources to 
counter real threats.  Anderson categorized threat actors based on whether they are 
enabled (have a capability to perform specific adversarial actions) and have access to 
systems, information, and personnel needed to perform these actions.  Combining intent 
and motives provides a database of capable and motivated threats to systems.  When 
analysts correlate actual indications of attackers, with actors who are motivated and 
enabled, they can make informed judgments regarding who is likely responsible for these 
indicators.  Although Anderson was not developing this architecture for simulation, his 
model provides a starting point to model threat actors and intent in multi-agent systems. 
(c) Network Analysis 
The field of network modeling and simulation uses queueing models and 
protocol analysis to analyze changes to protocols, packet size and format, and network 
configurations to optimize system performance [Katzela, 1998].  Additional constraints 
have been added to some models, to investigate additional aspects of a network.  Network 
Warfare Simulation (NETWARS) allows users to add additional constraints to a network 
simulation, to see the “...unanticipated effects of full operational combat network 
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loadings.”  The U.S. Department of Defense developed this communications modeling 
tool to “credibly model tactical communications demands with all the stresses and 
inefficiencies that combat places on communication systems” [DISA, 2001].  These 
models are only able to analyze the technical aspects of networks, and do not address 
social issues.   
5. IA Attacker Taxonomies and Motivations 
Numerous researchers have attempted to build taxonomies to classify attack 
actors.  
Denning [1990] limited her analysis to “non-malicious hackers,” or “someone that 
experiments with systems… playing with systems and making them do things that they 
were never intended to do” [Denning, 1990].  She developed five types of hacker 
motives: 
• access to computers and information for learning, 
• thrill, excitement, and challenge, 
• ethics and avoiding damage, 
• public image and treatment, 
• privacy and first amendment rights. 
 
This introduces the motives of one aspect of the human threat to information 
systems, but does not account for other aspects of human threats, such as insiders and 
malicious attackers. 
Wadlow [2000] states, “Attackers will be successful if they have sufficient skill, 
motivation, and opportunity.”  He goes on to state that there are three categories of 
attackers:  
• browsers, campers, and vandals;  
• spies and saboteurs;  
• and disgruntled (ex-) employees and (ex-) contractors.   
 
Browsers, campers, and vandals are the stereotypical hackers/crackers.  Browsers 
want to penetrate and look around.  Campers penetrate to use the superior resources of 
the target, such as high-speed networks, processors, and memory.  Vandals are often 
campers who have been discovered; they commit service denial or damage for ego 
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gratification.  Browsers, campers, and vandals are typically script kiddies – inexperienced 
individuals who don’t understand what they are doing, reusing script tools developed by 
others – motivated by ego and a desire to boast to friends.  They are not interested in the 
target system itself, rather they are interested in the resources, and will try to exploit 
those if they believe they can get away with it.  These attackers are not likely to use 
extraordinary means.  Wadlow uses the metaphor of wasps to describe their behavior:  
they look for an easy way into a system, they are difficult and expensive to remove once 
in, attacking them is foolish and dangerous, and ignoring them means you can never use 
the resource [Wadlow, 2000].   
Spies are looking for something very specific, where saboteurs want to deny you 
from doing something.  There are very few spies and saboteurs but they have very high 
skills and are very determined.  Spies may be political, freelance, or industrial.  They 
typically target specific individuals, corporations, and government agencies.  Their 
method is to collect huge amounts of information about the target system, rehearse before 
an actual attack, and if they are detected before they are finished, they will walk away.  
Saboteurs differ from vandals in that they target specific individuals, rather than vandals 
who target anyone.  Saboteurs also have a higher goal driving their damage and denial 
operations.   
Disgruntled (ex-)employees, and (ex-)contractors are motivated by being 
displeased.  They have the skills, training, and experience on the equipment that will be 
targets.  They have opportunity because they have access to systems, and their knowledge 
is high because they know the system capabilities and vulnerabilities that provide access. 
Cohen [2000] provides the most comprehensive categorization, listing 37 
categories (see Table 1 -- Cohen's Threat Actors).  Each of these threats has a 
corresponding definition, and a very general discussion of their likely goals.  These 
threats are also cross-linked to the attacks they are likely to use.  Although the 





activists foreign agents and spies nature 
club initiates fraudsters organized crime 
competitors global coalitions paramilitary groups 
consultants government agencies police 
crackers for hire hackers private investigators 
crackers hoodlums professional thieves 
customers industrial espionage experts reporters 
cyber-gangs information warriors terrorists 
deranged people infrastructure warriors tiger teams 
drug cartels insiders vandals 
economic rivals maintenance people vendors 
extortionists military organizations whistle blowers 
 nation states  
Table 1.  Cohen's Threat Actors [From Cohen 2000]). 
Carroll [1995] analyzed computer crime using the acronym MOMM for Motives, 
Opportunity, Means, and Methods.  Carroll discusses four motives for computer crimes; 
money, ideology, compromise (coercion), and egotism.  Opportunity consists of technical  
knowledge and physical and electronic access of a potential attacker.  Means are the 
processes used by the attacker to perform the attack; and are a general description of the 
action the attacker will do to achieve his goals, such as obtaining funds by printing a 
check or transferring funds to a location the attacker can access.  The method is the 
technical tool used to achieve the means.  
Parker [1998] used the acronym SKRAM (skills, knowledge, resources, authority, 
and motives) to differentiate cyber criminals based on properties or attributes that the 
criminals possess, not the activities they perform.  Parker’s categories of attacks include 
insider, malcontents, irrational, extremists, terrorists, personal problem-solver, cyber 
criminal, malicious hacker, hacker, and prankster.  Although the analysis is useful, it is 
not sufficiently complete for a computational simulation.  For example, the attacker’s 
dedication is not considered to describe the amount of time an attacker may take before 
being frustrated and quitting, or the amount of risk an attacker might be willing to take to 
complete a mission.    
These taxonomies provide insight on threat actor motivations, but they lack 
sufficient detail for building a comprehensive computational simulation of the IA 
 16 
 
domain.  Actors cannot be analyzed in a vacuum – and so at best, these categories 
provide a snapshot of a potential attacker at a moment in time.  They may capture their 
skills and motivations at that moment, but they don’t help explain the ultimate aims of the 
actor. 
6. Security Taxonomies 
There have been several attempts to build security taxonomies.  In the 
development of the Common Criteria [NIST, 1999] a superficial security taxonomy was 
developed to help explain “security concepts and terminology... and relationships,” and 
not as input into a simulation.  It greatly simplified the attacker and their goals. 
Several other security-related taxonomies have been introduced.  Landwehr et al.  
[1994] proposed a comprehensive taxonomy of software security flaws.  This research 
examined both “inadvertent” as well as “intentional” flaws, and built a high-level typing 
of software-introduced vulnerabilities.  They also provided taxonomies based on ‘time of 
introduction’ and the location of the flaw introduction. 
Victor Raskin is currently developing a security ontology, but it is currently 
incomplete, and no security simulations based upon this ontology have yet been 
developed [Raskin and Nirenburg, 2001]. 
7. Failures of Traditional Models 
The major problem with the previous security models and simulations is that they 
fail to observe that information assurance is fundamentally both a technical and social 
problem and should be modeled appropriately.  The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff state that 
human actors are one of the basic sources of threats to information systems.  They go on 
to say that defeating information system threats requires the integration of people, 
operations, and technology [DoD, 2000].  People are a component of the system, yet 
people are not part of the models. 
While few might argue that computer networks are social systems, little research 
has been conducted on the specifics of security-related social implications.  Denning et 
al. point out that “If we ignore (the) social aspects (of computer security), there is the 
danger of developing technologies that are not cost effective, do not address the actual 
threat, or jeopardize human rights” [Denning et al., 1987].  They go on to say that there 
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are “four topics related to the social aspects of computer security: security policy 
definition and awareness, user productivity, privacy, and information security.”  While 
their paper was a call to the security community to consider these topics in the 
development of computer systems, it provides a good starting point in the consideration 
of social modeling to computer security. 
Rheingold examined the social structure of “cyber villages.”  He states, “One of 
the surprising properties of computing is that it is a social activity...”  [Rheingold, 1993].  
He goes on to say that the anonymity of the network permits you to extend your “circle of 
friends” who have shared values and interest, and that the circle of friends provides an 
"information social contract to share information, not based on reciprocity, but on a gift 
economy” [Rheingold, 1993].  
When we look at empirical evidence of network attacks, we see social systems 
and deception in both attackers and defenders.  In The Cuckoo's Egg, Cliff Stoll [1990] 
discovers KGB-sponsored hackers on his network.  Stoll creates and nurtures a social 
group to defeat these attackers, and manipulates the attackers into performing acts 
(lengthy downloads from a ‘honey pot’) that result in their apprehension.  While Stoll 
was somewhat more candid than his adversaries, his behavior was no less exploitive or 
manipulative than that of his adversary.  In Masters of Deception, Slatalla [1995] 
provides insight into a social system of juvenile hackers.  The social system permits the 
hackers to share information and learn how to exploit systems.  This social system also 
results in their detection and downfall once their social group is penetrated. 
These two examples illustrate that, although the field of IA involves sophisticated 
technology, it is very much related to traditional warfare, spycraft, and statecraft.  Both 
attacker and defender are involved in various methods of intelligence, counter 
intelligence and deception operations.  If one were able to apply Machiavelli’s 
observations on deceit and conspiracy [Machiavelli, 1515], malicious activities in the 
information security domain might no longer exist.  Machiavelli observed that “the 
difficulties that confront a conspirator are infinite… many have been the conspiracies, but 
few have been successful; because he who conspires can not act alone, nor can he take a 
companion except from those whom he believes malcontent, and as soon as you have 
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opened your mind to a malcontent you have given him the material with which to content 
himself…” As Donath pointed out however, the attacker can hide his real identity.  This 
anonymity and lack of fear of reciprocity by the “state” can motivate the attacker to 
perform network “conspiracies.”  Once an attacker’s organization is penetrated then one 
can see the environment revert to Machiavelli’s traditional model. 
So a true simulation of the information assurance domain that covers both 
offensive and defensive capabilities, is a combined system that must model both human 
social interactions and the technical requirements which facilitate or constrain the social 
interactions. 
D. COMPUTATIONAL ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION ASSURANCE 
The ultimate purpose of modeling is to assess the “big picture” of a domain and 
gain insight into the inner workings of the system under investigation.  Prietula states that 
“Organizations are complex, dynamic, non-linear, adaptive, and evolving systems” and 
analytical models are a poor choice for modeling these systems  [Prietula et al., 1998].  
Computational analysis is a useful tool for studying these systems, but which 
computational methodology is most appropriate for modeling information assurance at 
the organizational level? 
In an attempt to answer this question, numerous methodologies were examined.  
This section examines the strengths and weaknesses of the following classes of 
computational systems: symbolic systems, connectionist approach, system dynamics, and 
multi-agent systems.  This section is not meant to imply that these are all of the classes of 
technologies available, not that these classes are mutually exclusive.  This section is 
meant to provide a broad overview of technologies that were examined, and a general 
comparison as to the strengths and weaknesses of each class. 
1. Symbolic Approach – Rule-Based Systems 
The symbolic approach builds computational systems using some form of 
problem solving or planning, and an internal manipulation of symbols based on a logic 
system such as first-order predicate calculus.  An example of a symbolic approach is a 
rule-based system.  A rule-based system typically consists of a start state and goal state, 
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each of which is represented as a set of facts.  The system also contains a set of if-then 
rules, or productions, and a reasoning, or inference engine.  The reasoning engine takes 
facts from the start state, and attempt to find a premise from a rule that matches these 
facts.  If the reasoning system finds a fact or set of facts that match the premise, it adds 
the conclusion of the rule to its current fact list.  This procedure continues until the goal is 
discovered or no rules can fire.  If the goal is discovered, the set of rules that can be 
traced from the start to the goal state are a viable solution to the problem.  This type of 
system is derived from Newell and Simon’s General Problem Solver using means-ends 
analysis [Newell and Simon, 1963]. 
These systems typically solve problems from the top-down; the developer creates 
a static set of rules prior to run-time that represent possible problem-solving steps.  The 
system iterates through these rules, applies facts, and possibly sub-rules in order to 
discover a solution.   
Rule-based systems have several advantages.  First, these systems emphasize the 
engineering of processes, using a divide-and-conquer approach that may seam intuitive to 
developers.  Additionally, rule-based systems are capable of having an explanation sub-
system, which can explain to users, through the rules that fired, how the system arrived at 
its goal.  These systems excel in static, deterministic, perfect information environments. 
Rule-based systems have several disadvantages in modeling IA.  First, and 
foremost, in traditional top-down rules-based systems the developer must predefine the 
rules and actions, and therefore problem solving capabilities, limiting the system to the 
imagination of developer.  In a large system, an engineer may not be able to define all 
contingencies and combinations a priori due to the combinatorial explosion if all 
combinations were tested [Axelrod, 1997], [Weiss, 1999].  The result is that rule-based 
systems cannot discover innovative solutions to unforcasted situations.   
Additionally, rule-based systems do not deal well in a dynamic, stochastic, or 
partially observable environments, especially in confrontational domains.  In these 
domains, an entity may be able to discover how a rule-based system acts in a given 




Simulation systems that are categorized as rule-based include SOAR [Laird et al., 
1987] and ACT-R [Anderson, 1993]. 
2. Connectionist Approach – Artificial Neural Networks 
The connectionist approach models cognitive processes based on neural science.  
If we think of the IA domain as a highly connected, cognitive process, then this approach 
is a viable computational tool.  There are numerous approached to developing 
connectionist systems, but this section will concentrate on artificial neural nets (ANN). 
An artificial neural net consists of a self-organizing, multi-layer network of 
primitive computational elements, or nodes.  The connections among nodes have weights 
that are adjusted, resulting in the system learning though supervised training.  The system 
is given a limited set of training data, and it adapts its weights to ‘fit’ the training data.  
The ANN can be considered a form of statistical inference [White, 1989]. 
By training an ANN to a set of training data, the system discovers what attributes 
are important to categorize the training set, in effect, performing pattern matching.  If the 
environment is small, then a large percentage of the situations may be presented to the 
ANN, resulting in the ANN memorizing the correct categories for all situations.  If the 
environment is very large, then the training set may represent only a very small subset of 
the possible situations possible, and the system generalizes based on the ANN’s 
implementation and training set. 
An advantage to the ANN approach is that the engineer does not have to spend a 
great deal of time with domain experts trying to enumerate what action to take in every 
possible situation.  The researcher collects a set of real-world examples and uses these as 
the training set, training the system to generalize on the appropriate action to take.  ANNs 
can make the development of systems feasible where the experts are not available, but 
historical case studies are available. 
Several disadvantages make ANNs inappropriate for modeling IA.  First, and 
foremost, if examples of situations are not in the training set, then they will not be 
represented internally in the ANN.  Second, ANNs learn offline.  In a highly dynamic 
environment, where we wish to model adaptive behavior, ANNs cannot adapt during a 
simulation execution.  ANNs add newly encountered situations and appropriate actions to 
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their training set and are retrained offline, which can be very time consuming.  
Additionally, ANNs are very good for generalizing, but may have difficulty with special 
cases.  These special cases may be treated as statistically insignificant noise and be 
generalized away – eliminating critically important IA events.  Additionally, ANNs have 
no probability distributions on output; a given set of inputs produces a given output, with 
no probability or explanation of the event occurring.  Lastly, ANNs have no way to 
explain their reasoning.  Their answers are derived through the complex interactions of a 
set of node and link weights, and attempting to understand the ANN’s reasoning is very 
difficult, if not impossible.  For these reasons, the connectionist approach was deemed 
inappropriate.  
3. System Dynamics – Stochastic Simulations 
In the field of system dynamics, the most appropriate tool for modeling IA is 
stochastic simulation.  Stochastic simulations, or logic sampling, examine empirical 
evidence in the form of statistical data, and build multi-connected graphs, or belief 
networks.  In the graph, a node represents a state, and a transition between nodes 
represents a probability of transitioning between states.  After building the graph the 
system generates a large number of models of the domain, by starting at a root in the 
graph and transitioning to a node representing a significant event.  The model results are 
compared, and the probability of an event occurring is the ratio of the number of times 
the simulation ended on that node to the total number of simulation runs.  
The major advantage of stochastic simulations is that they can provide statistical 
data on the probability of events occurring.  The probabilities in the belief network come 
from statistical analysis of empirical data.  They can also show chains of events that may 
lead to important events.   
A major problem with the use of stochastic simulations in modeling IA is that 
reliable statistical data may not exist that covers IA at the organizational level.  Since this 
data may not be accurate, the belief network will be flawed, and the results of the 
simulation will be invalid.   
Additionally, the environment of IA is dynamic, with entities adapting to the 
actions and inactions of other entities.  Building a belief network that takes into account 
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all of the variables and adaptation for a large number of entities presents an intractable 
problem.   
Finally, stochastic simulations break down when researchers are interested in 
outcomes that occur very rarely.  In these cases, the simulation is run a large number of 
times, discarding noninteresting outcomes.  The challenge is that the fraction of 
interesting, yet rare runs decreases exponentially with the number of evidence variables 
[Russell and Norvig, 1995].  In any large domain, finding these critical outliers may 
represent an intractable problem, since the repeated simulations may not discover these 
statistically insignificant, yet very important situations.  This research is interested in 
those outliers, the statistically insignificant events that may have a catastrophic effect on 
the security of an organization’s information and information systems.  For this reason, 
stochastic simulations were abandoned. 
4. Multi-Agent Simulations (MAS) 
While there is no commonly accepted definition for agents, Wooldridge proposes 
a definition that is used throughout this dissertation,  “An agent is a computer system that 
is situated in some environment, and that is capable of autonomous action in this 
environment in order to meet its design objectives” [Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995].  
Other definitions can be found in [Ferber, 1999], [Russell and Norvig, 1995] and [Weiss, 
1999].  
Multi-agent simulations (MAS) operate from the bottom-up, using multiple 
adaptive agents “…(as) intelligent actors, interacting among themselves by using their 
defined attributes and methods, but (are) able to modify those constraints to meet the 
goals assigned them by the modeler…providing real insight into how best to encourage 
and take advantage of individual initiatives and adaptability.”  
Researchers begin by developing the set of actors and objects in the system under 
investigation, and specify how these interact.  Researchers are then able to study the 
interdependencies between the system components and examine how the system as a 
whole evolves under varying system parameters.  Intelligence emerges through the 
interaction of many relatively simple autonomous agents [Weiss, 1999].  
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The socially capable autonomous agents interact within the environment, other 
objects in the environment, and other agents in an attempt to achieve their own individual 
goals.  The autonomous agents are able to change goals and select actions that they 
believe can help achieve these goals.  A benefit of this bottom-up approach is the ability 
to integrate new agents and objects into an existing simulation and modify system 
parameters to perform what-if analysis [Ferber, 1999].  These societies of agents provide 
researchers insight into the environment under investigation by creating virtual 
laboratories where researchers can explore changes in the agents, environment and 
society who are modeled after actual (or virtual) components found in actual or fictitious 
social systems.   
MASs have no centralized control -- the agent simulation is leaderless.  Each 
actor (agent) in the simulation independently pursues its own independent goals.  Some 
actors may cooperate while others compete.  The result is a highly dynamic environment 
where software actors, with no human intervention, can search the space of resources and 
goals and develop innovative solutions for challenges discovered in the environment. 
Multi-agent research has been conducted in areas ranging from artificial life 
[Langton, 1988] to real worlds [Jones et al., 1999].  Varieties of MAS architectures, from 
purely reactive to cognitive, have been developed to model the various environments.   
Cognitive agents (or deliberative agents), from the distributed artificial 
intelligence (DAI) community, are traditionally based on first-order predicate logic, 
sophisticated reasoning, and rely on the internal manipulation of symbols.  These agents 
maintain a symbolic representation of the environment within which they operate, and 
focus on communication and cooperation between agents.  Most importantly, these 
agents have intentions -- goals and plans to achieve goals.  Cognitive agents inherit the 
strengths and weaknesses of rule-based systems as discussed above. 
Reactive agents, from the field of artificial life (A-Life), are reflexive -- actions 
are “reactions” to stimulus regulated by perceptions and the agent’s internal state.  These 
agents maintain no planning, history, or symbolic representation of the world.  The 
simple reactive agents are combined into a society, where intelligence is seen as emergent 
from the vast interactions of the agents and the environment.  Refer to Figure 1-- 
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Spectrum of Agent Architectures.  See [Weiss, 1999] for a more detailed comparison of 
cognitive and reactive agents.  
 
Figure 1.  Spectrum of agent architectures. 
Unlike cognitive agents, reactive agents do not posses any internal plan or model 
of the environment.  They do not explore alternatives.  Rather, they generate actions, and 
these actions may result in fulfilling their goals.  The actions that led to the agent 
achieving a goal can be studied as an implied plan that emerged from the application of 
simple reactive rules. 
Many properties of reactive multi-agent systems make them a beneficial 
architecture for the modeling of information assurance.  Creating reactive agents is 
simple when compared to rule-based systems.  The systems are computationally tractable 
and robust.  The agents thrive when the environment is stable and tend to adapt rapidly to 
changes [Axelrod, 1997].  Finally, and most importantly, agents apply simple reactive 
rules to states and discover “what works”.  The agent adjusts to the environment, and 
adapts.  This adaptation results in the agent discovering possible new solutions to 
problems without any explicit plan or engineering bias. 
Multi-agent systems are not without challenges.  First, reactive agents take a local 
view, with no long-term plan.  This may cause agents to become caught in a ‘local 
maximum’, unable to find a more global maximum.  There has been little research in the 
agent’s use of exploration of new actions, versus the exploitation of previous successful 
actions, so agents may discover one path that is successful and abandon searching for 
additional, better plans.    Additionally, MAS systems may have to deal with conflicting 




From the engineer’s point of view, it can be very difficult to ‘tune’ agents to 
perform properly in environments.  The agent’s behavior emerges, and causing the 
correct behavior to emerge may prove difficult.  Finally, the dynamics between many 
conflicting goals or behaviors, may be very complex and quickly overcome an engineers 
ability to understand the results of these many interactions [Weiss, 1999]. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to model the technical and observable social 
phenomena found in the field of IA.  As such, we are not concerned with producing 
software replicas of actual humans.  We wish to create a set of agents who represent 
individuals found in the IA environment, and whose observable behavior emulates those 
real-world individuals.  To achieve this, a composite agent architecture was created that 
takes advantage of the strengths of both cognitive and reactive agent architectures [Hiles 
et al., 2001]. 
For additional general information on agents and MASs see [Ferber, 1999], 
[Weiss, 1999].  For seminal MAS architectures and simulations see SugarScape [Axtell 
and Epstein, 1996], Swarm [Langton, 1997], ISAAC combat simulation [Ilachinski, 
1997], and Echo simulated world [Echo, 2000]. 
E. UNIFIED MODELING LANGUAGE 
This dissertation uses the Unified Modeling Language (UML) to formally 
represent the primitives of the IA model that is introduced.  The UML provides a 
standard graphical notation for visualizing the components in software systems, and for 
documenting conceptual organizational processes.  Developers can use this formal 
modeling language to express the structure and behavior of a system [Booch et al., 
1999].   
As stated in [Booch et al., 1999], there are four aims in modeling: 
• to help visualize a system 
• to specify the structure or behavior of a system 
• to give a template that guides in construction 
• to document decisions made. 
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UML is used for these purposes.  In addition it is “… expressive enough to model 
nonsoftware systems, such as workflow…. and the design of hardware”.  The UML is 
used for two purposes in this dissertation.  First, it is used as a graphical notation to 
illustrate the model developed for this dissertation.  The UML formalizes the meaning of 
the language operators by providing representational rigor and software repeatability.  
Second, it is used to express the structure and behavior of the software developed as an 
implementation of the model. 
Defining the things, relationships, and diagrams is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.  A general description of the UML notation used in this dissertation is 
provided in Appendix B.  An excellent user guide is [Booch et al., 1999], and a 
comprehensive reference manual is [Rumbaugh et al., 1999] 
F. SUMMARY 
The modeling and simulation of the IA domain has been an ongoing effort for 
over thirty years.  Numerous formal and informal models provide a wealth of information 
on various portions of the domain, but fail to capture the complex, adaptive nature of IA 
when it is viewed as a social system. 
The next chapter uses lessons learned in multi-agent system design to develop a 





III.   COMPUTATIONAL MODEL OF INFORMATION 
ASSURANCE (IA) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces the Social-Technical Information Assurance Model 
(STIAM).  STIAM is a computational model of information assurance.  The model has 
two components: a formal model, and a descriptive model.  The formal model uses 
mathematical notation to describe the elements of the model.  The descriptive model 
provides a graphical representation of the formal model.  Combined, these two 
components permit researchers to model elements of information assurance (IA) at the 
organizational level. 
This chapter presents STIAM in formal mathematical notation and depicted 
graphically using the Unified Modeling Language (UML) [Booch et al., 1999].  Chapter 
IV introduces a data structure called connectors.  Connector-based models and notation 
are introduced, and STIAM is presented in the connector notation.   
B. OVERVIEW 
The objective of this research is to examine how IA issues affect organizations as 
a whole.  This work does not model individual devices and connections on a network, nor 
the specifics regarding how information flows through devices and nodes.  Rather it  
focuses on how decisions and omissions made by humans affect an organization at the 
enterprise level.  In order to ask and answer meaningful questions, a precise set of 
definitions and relationships must be elaborated. 
The term environment refers to the real-world situation being modeled.  In this 
research, environment is limited to relevant social organizations, people, and information 
processes and technologies that are responsible for IA issues in the real world.  The term 
society represents an abstraction of the environment, depicting generalizations of the 
entities, their structures, and their relationships within the environment. 
At the highest level of abstraction, the society contains a group of organizations -- 
social entities that exist for a particular purpose.  From an IA perspective, the components 
 28 
 
of the organization are information and people.  Information may exist in any format 
including electronic, paper, punched cards, stone tablets, etc.  People use the information 
to achieve goals.  Accessing and modifying information takes place through an 
organizational infrastructure that contains processes that access and modify the 
information, and an interface on the infrastructure to allow people to interact with the 
information.  Electronic technology might or might not be embedded in this 
infrastructure. 
From an information-centric perspective, the key components of an organization 
are: 
• Critical information required for the organization to perform its mission. 
• Information processes that interact with the information and provide an 
interface for human actors. 
• Key individuals that interact with the information processes directly and 
thereby interact with the information indirectly. 
• Roles that individuals are assigned within the organization that guide them 
in their goals and provide capabilities needed to achieve these goals. 
• The policies and procedures that define the organization. 
 
Information, processes, and roles combine to form organizations, and 
organizations, infrastructures, and actors combine to form the society.  These components 
are the building blocks of the Social-Technical Information Assurance Model (STIAM) 
presented in this chapter.  The following sections examine these relationships in further 
detail. 
C.   SOCIETY  
A society is comprised of three disjoint domains with each domain containing 
multiple autonomous entities.  The three domains are the organizations, infrastructures, 
and people, or actors.  Formally, a society, s, is defined as a tuple relationship expressed 
in Equation 1:  
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s = <O, I, A> 
where: 
O is a set of Organizations 
I is a set of Infrastructures 
A is a set of Actors  
Equation 1.  A Society of Organizations, Infrastructures and Actors. 
The Organization domain contains a set of abstract representations of social 
groups.  The Infrastructure domain consists of a set of abstract representations of the 
critical information within an organization as well as the information processes that 
access and process that information.  The Actor domain consists of actors, which are 
abstract representations of humans critical to IA.  Combined, the elements of the domains 
are the entities in the society.  See Figure 2 for a high-level conceptual diagram of the 
model. 














            interacts with *1...*1
interacts with
 
Figure 2.  A Conceptual Diagram: A Society composed of  
Organizations, Infrastructures, and Actors2. 
There are numerous relationships between the three domains of the society.  For 
example: 
• a particular Actor may assume multiple roles in multiple Organizations, 
                                                          
2 This is a conceptual diagram of the IA model.  This diagram depicts the major 
entities, and the relationships between these entities.  The components of the entities are 
not depicted in this diagram to facilitate clarity.  See Appendix B for a summary of the 
UML notation used in this document. 
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• each Organization may have multiple roles that various Actors can 
perform, 
• a particular Actor may interact with many Infrastructures, 
• each Infrastructure may interact with numerous Actors, 
• an Organization may define one or more Infrastructures,   
• an Infrastructure belongs to a single Organization. 
 
The remainder of this chapter will describe these domains and the associations 
between them.  
D.   DOMAINS AND ELEMENTS IN A SOCIETY 
Before elaborating on the domains and the elements and associations that make up 
those domains, a key concept of the model must be introduced, the concept of tokens. 
1. Tokens 
Tokens are an abstract representation of simple static objects that are in the 
environment being modeled.  Tokens allow static objects in the environment to be 
modeled without significantly increasing the complexity of the model.  Tokens may 
represent passwords, keys, access badges, etc that are found in the environment. 
 Equation 2 depicts a particular token ti as an element in the set of all possible 
tokens Ts in the society s.  Figure 3 entitled “The Token Class in UML” depicts a token 
graphically. 
ti ∈ Ts 
ti = <namei> 
where: 
Ts is the union of all tokens in all elements in society s 
<namei> is a string label for the token ti 




Figure 3.  A Token class in UML. 
A set Ts consists of all possible tokens in the society s.  Tokens are represented in 




The infrastructure domain I contains a set of infrastructures.  An infrastructure 
represents the aggregate of the information processing capabilities and the critical 
information resources found within an organization. 
A particular infrastructure i ∈ I is defined as a tuple as shown in Equation 3:  
i = <IRi, INi, Ti> 
where: 
IRi is a set of information resources in infrastructure i 
INi is a set of all interfaces for infrastructure i 
Ti is the set of all tokens stored on the infrastructure i 
Equation 3.  An Infrastructure composed of Information Resources,  
Interfaces, and Tokens. 
An organization possessing information resources must have some means to 
access and process the information resources.  The infrastructure represents the 
information possessing capabilities of an organization in an environment.  An interface 
represents the prerequisite ‘handshake’ that must occur before actors and other 
infrastructures are able to interact with these processes.   
A set of tokens may be stored on the infrastructure.  This represents critical 
information that is on the infrastructure that may be acquired by actors and utilized to 
achieve additional infrastructure access.  This process is discussed later. 
Graphically, the infrastructure relationships are depicted in Figure 4 entitled “An 













Figure 4.  An Infrastructure composed of Resources, Interfaces, and Tokens. 
a.   Information Resources 
Information Resources, hereafter called Resources, are the critical 
information sets whose confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability are required for the 
organization to exist.  Resources represent the content of information and not file objects 
like data files, email, etc.   
Resources will represent different information and processes for different 
organizations in the environment being modeled.  A government organization may be 
concerned with national intelligence secrets.  Financial institutions may be concerned 
with banking transactions and balances.  A particular corporation may be concerned with 
two resources; one representing sensitive proprietary research and development 
information, and another representing their customer database.  The bottom line is that 
the resources represent the critical information and processes within the organization, 
whose disclosure, corruption, or nonavailability may cause harm to the organization or 
that may be of interest to outside attackers.  
b. Interface 
Interactions between the infrastructure and other entities occur through an 
interface.  An interface is a mechanism specified by the infrastructure whereby entities 
that can connect with the interface are able to affect the infrastructure and its component 
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parts.  An interface contains the requirements necessary for an entity to interact with an 
infrastructure and a set of actions that occur if those requirements are met.  These 
interactions model information services that employees, customers, or attackers may 
access to cause effects on the infrastructure and resources.   
A particular interface, inj, is defined by the tuple as shown in Equation 4: 
inj = < nj, sj, Tj, ae, ACj > 
where: 
nj = name of the interface 
sj is the state of the interface where sj∈ {active, inactive } 
 Tj ⊆ Ts  --a set of interface tokens 
ae is an active entity where ae ∈ (A ∪ I) 
 ACj = set of actions 
Equation 4.  The components of the interface. 
Figure 5, entitled “UML diagram of an Interface” depicts an interface and its 
components.  















activeState == true indicates the
interface is accessible,
activeState == false indicates the







Figure 5.  UML diagram of an Interface. 
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The name of an interface is a simple string label used to refer to the 
interface.  The state property indicates if the interface is accessible at that moment in 
time.  An inactive interface cannot be accessed by another entity.  The state property 
permits a researcher to model the activation and inactivation of processes and services 
within an infrastructure, permitting the modeling of a dynamic system over time. 
Each infrastructure has a set of interfaces that prescribe how actors and 
other infrastructure may interact with the infrastructure.  Additionally, interfaces are used 
for interacting with actors.  The actor interface is discussed later.  The interface owner 
provides a pointer to the entity to which the interface provides access.   
It is assumed in this model that an interface may permit multiple entities to 
simultaneously bind at any time.  The number of entities that are permitted to bind is 
specified in the interface’s cardinality value.   
There are two types of interfaces defined: the producer and the consumer.  
The producer advertises that the infrastructure has a process or action it performs.  This 
may represent a web server, a help desk, database access, etc.  The consumer interface 
advertises that an entity is seeking a matching producer interface; the consumption of the 
process or action that the producer is advertising.  Infrastructures may have any 
combination of producer or consumer interfaces.  
The producer has prerequisites that must be met in order to utilize the 
services or processes it models.  These prerequisites may be something an entity must 
know (password or phone number), has (a key or physical access to a location), or is 
(biometric data).  These prerequisites are represented as tokens that must be presented by 
the consumer in order to access the producer interface.  If the producer’s tokens are a 
subset of the consumer’s tokens then the prerequisites have been met.   
The actual mechanism for entities to assume the producer and consumer 
types, and to interact with one another, is described in detail in Chapter IV.  For now, 
assume an entity that has a goal of consuming a service activates its interface, creates a 
consumer message, and sends the message to the producer.  If the producer’s interface is 
active, the interface names match, and the message contains at least the producer’s 
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required tokens, the interfaces are said to connect.  The connection can be thought of as a 
temporary contract, where the producer wishes to provide a service, and the consumer 
wishes to utilize this service.  This contract, or connection, is maintained until one of the 
parties discontinues the connection, at which time the interfaces, and subsequently the 
owning agents, disconnect.  
c. Interface Actions 
A set of actions may be designated to execute on the owning entity of the 
participating consumer and producer interfaces immediately upon a connection occurring, 
upon a connection breaking, or upon the owning entity’s request.  These actions permit 
researchers to model the results of entities interacting in the environment. 
There are three types of action results: changing an interface state, 
accessing a resource, and having an entity send a message to the other party of the 
connection.  Changing an interface state causes an infrastructure to activate or inactivate 
interfaces, resulting in the addition or removal of capabilities on an infrastructure.  This 
may represent an entity installing, activating, deactivating, or removing services on an 
infrastructure.  Thus, connecting to an interface may result in changing the interface 
itself. 
Some interface actions may result in accessing a resource.  These actions 
represent the actors either reading from or writing to a resource.  This represents a person 
successfully accessing a critical resource. 
An action may send a message to the other party of the interface 
connection.  The message may contain tokens or tickets (tickets are discussed in chapter 
V).  This represents an infrastructure providing additional materials or services to other 
entities in the binding.  This might represent an individual defeating a poor security 
interface and acquiring the password file, represented as a set of tokens, from a system. 
d. Aggregating Infrastructures 
An organization may have one or more infrastructures that define the 
actual capabilities and limitations of that organization’s information processes.  The 
decision to maintain individual infrastructures or to aggregate them into a single 
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infrastructure depends on the goals of the modeler.  For example, a researcher may be 
examining a very large society, with numerous organizations and actors, so he may 
aggregate the infrastructures in each organization onto a single infrastructure in order to 
order to observe the ‘big picture’ and ensure the environment is manageable.  On the 
other hand, a researcher may be interested in more detailed information on a few entities, 
in which case he may decide to deaggregate the infrastructures in order to model more 
detail. 
3. Organizations 
Organizations represent social groups within the environment being modeled.  As 
expressed in Equation 5, an organization oi ∈ O is a collection of organizational IA 
policies POi and actor roles ROi :   
oi = < POi, ROi > 
where: 
 POi is a set of policies for an organization oi 
ROi is a set of roles for an organization oi 
Equation 5.  An Organization consisting of Roles and Policies. 
Organizations do not model actual social groups or collaborations, but are an 
idealized modeling concept to facilitate insight into IA at the macro level.  Organizations 
range from formal enterprises such as commercial and government entities, to informal 
collections of individuals with a common goal such as hacker clubs, social groups, etc.  
The organization may represent a team with heterogeneous, interdependent roles, or a 
group of homogeneous, interchangeable roles [Kang et al., 1998].  Figure 6, entitled “An 








Figure 6.  An Organization consisting of Roles and Policies. 
a.   Policies 
Policies are a set of rules specified by an organization that state the 
desired restrictions to entities that can access resources, and in what access mode.  The 
term policy, as used here, represent the organization’s desires to protect the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of an organization’s information resources, not 
the actual implementation.  The implemented technical security policy [Brinkley and 
Schell, 1994] is implied in the interfaces and their subsequent actions on the 
infrastructure. 
Policies are not access validation rules, such as access control lists or 
capability lists, used to determine access decisions on the infrastructures.  The policies 
are the desired and specified restrictions to resources, what Sterne calls the Security 
Policy Objectives; “A statement of intent to protect an identified resource from 
unauthorized use…”  [Sterne, 1991].  The security of an organization can “only be said to 
be ‘secure’ with regard to some specific security policy, stated in terms of controlling 
access of persons to information” [Brinkley and Schell, 1994].  This being the case, the 




A policy pk ∈ POi is declared by the tuple:  
pk = <e, irk, m, au> 
where: 
e ∈ (A ∪ I ∪ {*})  
where * = entity wildcard character 
irk∈ IRi is the resource the policy refers 
m ∈ {read, write} = access mode 
au ∈ {permit, forbid} = authorization 
Equation 6.  A Policy consisting of an Entity, Infrastructure, Mode, and 
Authorization. 
If a particular entity, e referred to in the security community as the subject, 
accessed some resource irk in some mode m that is not permitted, or that is explicitly 
prohibited by a policy, then that entity has violated the organizational security policy.   
The subject of the policy, e, was deliberately chosen to be an entity, rather 
than an actor.  This is because, an actor a may connect to an infrastructure interface in1, 
which may cause an action to execute.  This action, executing on ir1, may cause ir1 to 
attempt to connect to another interface on another infrastructure, in2.  In this case, the 
active entity making the connection to in2 is an infrastructure, not an actor. 
Read and write modes are all that are required to describe rules for access 
[Brinkley and Schell, 1994].  Connecting to an interface may cause the execution of a 
particular action, but this action subsequently needs to access a resource in read or write 
mode to cause any significant IA event.  Therefore, an explicit execution mode is not 
required for this model.  
The policy mechanism as described above is very robust, permitting the 
expression of both open and closed security policies [Lunt, 1989] using the entity 
wildcard character ‘*’ literal.  This character represents the union of the actor and 
infrastructure sets, and allows the expression of all active entities as being permitted or 
forbidden access to a specific resource. 
A closed policy forbids all accesses except those that are explicitly 
permitted.  An open policy permits access to all resources that are not explicitly 
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forbidden.  To express the former, the researcher adds policy rules forbidding all entities 
access to a resource irk for both access modes: 
• <*, irk, read, forbid> 
• <*, irk, write, forbid> 
Next, the researcher selectively adds rules to record permitted access to 
resource irk to selective entities.  To express an open policy the researcher explicitly 
permits all access, and then add rules to selectively forbid  access to certain entities. 
The policies as specified create two partitioned sets of policies, those that 
are permitted and those that are forbidden.  These sets are independent, and may conflict 
[Lunt, 1988], resulting in permitted and forbidden authorization simultaneously.  These 
cases may represent actual situations in the environment, and must be reconciled if they 
occur.  There are numerous subtleties in expressing and implementing policies, as 
addressed in [Lunt, 1988], and [Brinkley and Schell, 1994].  
Finally, the actual implementation of security policies are embedded in the 
infrastructures.  The infrastructure interfaces and actions should support the 
organizational policies, but in reality, there might exist a means to bypass these policies 
on the infrastructures.  An entity may bind with an infrastructure using the system 
capabilities in a way that is possible, but that violates the policies of the organization.  
The policy system as specified provides a means to detect these violations. 
b. Roles 
The set of actor roles ROi is a collection of defined behaviors specified for 
an organization.  These roles are placeholders, initially defined but unfilled by actors.  
Roles are discussed in the following section. 
4. Organizational Roles 
A role is a relationship between an organization and an actor.  A role can be 
thought of as a placeholder within the organization that an actor may fit.  The role directs 
specific actions on the participating actor by providing goals to the agent to pursue.  
Some of the typical roles critical to an IA simulation are system users, system 
administrators, managers, cyber attackers, and vendors.   
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It is assumed in this model that all goals and actions are derived from the actor’s 
assigned roles.  Furthermore, it is assumed that an actor commits to roles, and that roles 
are voluntary. 
A particular actor ak may commit to a particular role ri ∈ ROj.  The role is depicted 
in Figure 7 and is defined by the tuple: 
ri = < RGi,, RQi, Ti> 
where: 
RGi is a set of Role Goals provided by the role 
RQi is a set of prerequisite Role Requirements 
Ti is a set of Tokens provided by the role 


















Figure 7.  A Role and its components. 
a.   Role Goals 
Role Goals, RG, are desires an agent pursues.  Actors who commit to a 
role are given goals that are then added to the actor’s goal set G.  These goals represent 
additional commitments that the agent must pursue.  Goals have priorities, and new, 
higher priority goals may eliminate older lower priority goals, thereby causing the 
impression of goal elimination.  Actors assign priorities, or weights, to goals to aid in 
resolving goal role conflicts.  Actor goals are discussed in detail in Chapter V. 
b.  Role Requirements 
Roles have requirements that must be met prior to assuming a role.  It is 
assumed that any actor that fulfills these prerequisites is permitted to assume an 
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unoccupied role.  These prerequisites may be tokens, prerequisite roles, or some 
particular actor knowledge or personality attribute (see Chapter V for a discussion of 
personality and skill sets).  Roles may also have corequisites that must be maintained.  
Failure to maintain corequisites may result in the role being revoked by the organization 
such as being fired or thrown out of a group. 
A role requirement RQi is defined formally by the tuple: 
RQi = < Ri,, Ti, BMi, Ki > 
where: 
Ri is a set of prerequisite Roles 
Ti is a set of prerequisite Tokens 
BMi is a set of personality traits, referred to as Behavior Moderators 
Ki is a set of agent skills or knowledge 
Equation 8.  Role Requirements as a Collection of Sets. 
The role requirement is a collection of sets as defined in Equation 8.  An 
actor requesting to assume the role must possess each of the elements in each set.  Roles 
are discussed in detail in Chapter V.   
c. Role Cardinality 
Role cardinality refers to the number of actors who may simultaneously 
fill a single role.  Role cardinality is always one.  If an organization contains multiple 
homogeneous roles, then they are represented as duplicate roles to which different actors 
may commit.  Figure 8, entitled “Multiple homogeneous System Administrator roles,” 
depicts two homogeneous roles, both being system administrators.  Each role is 





bob: Actor mary: Actor
sysadmin2: Rolesysadmin1: Role
 
Figure 8.  Multiple homogeneous System Administrator roles. 
d. Role Tokens 
Tokens provided as a component of a role represent objects provided by 
an organization to a role member to assist in performing the role.  Tokens may represent 
authority required, authorization tokens, or other physical or logical objects or properties 
in the environment being modeled.  Access tokens may be: 
• physical, such as access to a location, 
• logical, such as read and write permissions on data objects,  
• social, such as the ability to interact with other actors.   
 
Tokens may include other objects provided by the organization including 
financial assets, software, devices, physical tools, etc.  In some cases an organization may 
not provide all of the tokens required to satisfy the goals of a role, so an actor may need 
to use some other means to obtain the tokens to satisfy the goal, such as acquiring them 
from other actors or infrastructures.  This is discussed in Chapter VI. 
5. Actors 
An actor is an abstract software representation of IA-relevant humans in an 
environment being investigated.  Actors may represent individual humans, such as each 
member of a very diverse research team, or may be an aggregate of a relatively 
homogeneous set of individuals, such as all of an office’s cleaning staff.  If a researcher is 




Actors are “cognitively limited” [Prietula, 1998].  Since this research is not 
interested in building complex cognitive representations of the human thought process, 
relatively simple reactive software agents can be used. 
An actor receives its capabilities and desires from the roles to which it is 
committed.  The roles may provide tokens to aid in the satisfaction of a goal.  
Additionally, a role provides a set of one or more goals that are commitments to the 
Roles.  Goals need procedural knowledge so that the agent can pursue and achieve these 
goals, and an action set, which are the capabilities that the actor can execute. 
Figure 9 illustrates conceptually the major components of an actor.  The diagram 
depicts an actor defined in terms of the roles to which it has been committed.  The roles 
provide the actor with goals it attempts to fulfill.  The procedural knowledge provides the 
actor with the means to achieve the goals, utilizing the actor’s available tokens.  Finally, 
the actor selects actions to perform.  These actions attempt to interact with other entities 
through their interfaces.  The actor also possesses interfaces that permit other entities to 
interact with the actor.  Successfully connecting to an actor’s interface may result in the 
actor executing another action, possibly changing that actor’s internal components or goal 
priorities.  The actual agent implementation is dependent on the researcher’s goals.  An 




Figure 9.  Conceptual diagram of an actor entity. 
E.   SUMMARY 
This chapter introduces the Social-Technical Information Assurance Model 
(STIAM).  The formal and descriptive model permits researchers to investigate a society 
of organizations, actors, and infrastructures, and their component elements at the 
organizational level.  This model permits researchers to model an environment at a 
variety of abstraction level.  STIAM is designed to be implemented as a computational 
software system to permit researchers to investigate the society and its elements and their 
interactions. 
Chapter IV will translate STIAM into a multi-agent model.  This is performed 
using a data structure called iconnectors.  The connector-based model of IA uses a special 
graphical notation that is useful for clearly modeling a society, and visualizing the 
dynamics of the system of elements.  Chapter V provides a detailed description of a 
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IV. CONNECTORS AND A CONNECTOR-BASED MODEL OF 
INFORMATION ASSURANCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces connectors, a powerful communications mechanism for 
developing computational models of complex domains, and for implementing these 
models in software simulation systems.  This chapter builds on the mechanisms as 
proposed by John Hiles [Hiles et al., 2001] and discussed in [VanPutte et al., 2001], 
[Hiles et al., 2002], and [Osborn, 2002].   
This dissertation develops and implements two types of connector mechanisms.  
The first, simply called ‘connectors’, was proposed by John Hiles [Hiles et al., 2001] and 
first implemented by Brian Osborn as part of his dissertation [Osborn, 2002].  This 
connector mechanism was extended and used strictly as an internal communications 
mechanism within actors, as discussed in Chapter V.  The second type of connector, 
called infrastructure connector or ‘iconnector’, is used in this research as an inter-entity 
communications mechanism.  This chapter makes extensive use of the iconnector 
mechanism. 
This chapter presents the concept of iconnectors, including a formalism for 
defining iconnectors and their interactions.  It then provides a graphical notation for 
illustrating connector-based models.  Finally, it describes the components of iconnectors 
in detail, and relates these components to the computational IA model presented in 
Chapter III.  
B. ICONNECTORS 
1. Introduction 
Computational systems that contain numerous autonomous entities require a 
mechanism to facilitate communication between entities.  Numerous communications 
mechanisms have been proposed and implemented in multi-agent systems.  See [Weiss, 
1999] for a summary of agent communication mechanisms and protocols. 
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For purely communicating agents [Ferber, 1999] such as those proposed in the IA 
model, we propose a lightweight communication mechanism called iconnectors.  
2. Definitions 
Iconnectors are a lightweight inter-agent communications mechanism inspired by 
biology.  Iconnectors resemble the mechanisms that support chemical flow through multi-
cellular membranes3.  The cells of a multi-cellular organism communicate using proteins 
that extend through the cell membrane walls.  These proteins sense a cell’s outer 
environment and allow passage of materials in and out of the cell.  Carbohydrate chains 
are attached to the proteins on the outer layer.  A molecule external to the cell that 
matches the carbohydrate tags cause a “signal” to travel through the carbohydrate into the 
protein, thereby signaling a change in the cell.  
The result of building iconnector-enabled agents is a biologically based 
computational system.  Iconnectors use a process called connecting [Hiles et al., 2002] or 
binding to facilitate inter-agent communications.  Communications between entities 
occur via this binding, first during setup, and possibly later when using the link. 
Entities create iconnector objects that represent a desire to communicate with 
other entities.  These iconnectors are registered with a singleton entity called ibinder.  
The ibinder acts as the switchboard, attempting to find another iconnector that matches 
the first.  If the ibinder finds a match it registers these two iconnectors as connected, and 
they are said to bind.  It is at this point that the entities are said to be communicating 
through the iconnectors.  Thus, the iconnectors act as facilitators of communications, and 
the ibinder acts as the digital switchboard binding iconnectors that match. 
Figure 10 depicts the three major components in the iconnector process.  
                                                          
3 Based on a personal conversation with John Hiles, Naval Postgraduate School, 












Figure 10.  The IBinder binds Iconnectors, which are components of Entities. 
 
3. Iconnectors and Entity Interfaces 
Iconnectors are used in the IA computational model to implement 
communications between entities.  The iconnectors are a simple mechanism for 
implementing the functional specifications, connection setup, and communications 
interfaces for the numerous entities in the model.   
An iconnector is an “active object that can sense and react to the environment” 
[Hiles et al., 2001].  An iconnector is not a passive property of an entity.  Iconnectors 
react to operations performed by the owning entities and have the potential for affecting 
other entities.  These effects are realized through sets of actions that can be associated 
with iconnectors that execute on the owning entity upon the iconnector changing state 
and bindings. 
4. Formalism 
An Iconnector is defined in Equation 9 and depicted graphically in UML in 
Figure 11, entitled “Iconnector Class Diagram”.  
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An Iconnector ci is defined by the tuple: 
ci=<li, ei, si, cai ,ACi, ty| li ∈L, ei∈(A∪I), si∈ S, cai ∈ I+, ty ∈ TY> 
where: 
L = {n, Ti| n = name, Ti ⊆Ts} = label 
e ∈ (A ∪ I) = an active entity in the society s 
S = {extended, retracted}= set of iconnector states 
I+ = {0,1,2,3,...} = cardinality 
ACi = set of actions 
TY = {socket, plug}=set of iconnector end types 
Equation 9.  An iconnector specification consisting of Labels, State, and Cardinality. 
Equation 9 states that an iconnector is composed of a label, owning entity, state, 
cardinality, set of actions, and type designation.  A label li expresses the requirements 
needed to bind to an iconnector; a name for the iconnector, and tokens required to interact 
with the interface.  The researcher determines appropriate names for all interfaces on all 
entities.  These names are used to designate desired communications with other 
iconnectors.   
 Each iconnector has an entity pointer that indicates the entity for which the 
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Figure 11.  Iconnector Class Diagram. 
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Each of the components of the iconnector are discussed in detail in the following 
sections.  Before presenting all of the components of iconnectors, a simple iconnector 
notation is presented. 
C.   ICONNECTOR GRAPHICAL NOTATION 
The iconnector notation is used to depict a connector-based system.  The 
advantages of the iconnector-based notation are brevity and clarity.  The notation allows 
a security analysts to depict entities and their relationships though simple diagrams, and 
this notation permits security analysts to visualize the society as the states of the entity 
interfaces change over time.  UML diagrams can be used to append additional detail as 
necessary. 
In the iconnector notation, entities are depicted as in Figure 12.  Actors are 
circles, infrastructures are rounded rectangles, resources are triangles within the owning 
infrastructure, and organizations are octagon.  Name labels are provided above the 
components.  Goals, roles, and organizations are not depicted in the basic iconnector 
notation, but are discussed in Chapter V. 
 
Figure 12.  An Actor ‘bob’, an Infrastructure ‘proprietary_network with a 
Resource  ‘corp_database’ and an Organization ‘enterprise’. 
A simple iconnector diagram is depicted in Figure 13.  This diagram depicts an 
actor ‘bob’, with a plug iconnector extended and an infrastructure ‘enterprise’ with a 
socket iconnector extended.  Graphically, an iconnector is rendered as a solid line, 
beginning within an ‘owning’ entity, and directed out of the entity, with an end symbol 




   Actor            Infrastructure           Organization
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Figure 13.  Entities with Iconnectors added. 
The mediating ibinder object is not depicted on the diagram.  The iconnectors are 
drawn as if they extend and retract in the society, but in implementation, the ibinder 
handles the mechanism of the binding process.  Elimination of the ibinder from the 
diagram improved the clarity of the drawing. 
The iconnector label may be depicted on the iconnector diagram. 
D. ICONNECTOR COMPONENTS 
An iconnector has several properties and functionalities.   A detailed discussion of 
the components is provided in this section. 
1.   Iconnector State – Extended or Retracted 
Iconnectors have a Boolean state: extended or retracted.  A retracted iconnector is 
inactive, and cannot connect to any other iconnector.  An extended iconnector is currently 
available for connecting.  Extending and retracting iconnectors is a symbolic way of 
saying that functionality is enabled or disabled.  If a connection occurs, and one of the 
iconnectors subsequently retracts, then the binding is broken, and subsequently the 
remaining extended iconnector may connect to another extended iconnector.  An 
extended iconnector is distinguished from a retracted iconnector graphically by a small 











Figure 14.  Extended and Retracted Iconnectors for an Infrastructure. 
Infrastructures have iconnectors that represent interfaces to processes on an 
organizational infrastructure.  Binding to one of these iconnectors may cause actions to 
execute that cause other iconnectors to extend or retract representing the activation or 
inactivation of processes on the infrastructure.  Actors extend and retract iconnectors, 
which represent actions the actor is performing in the support of goals. 
Iconnectors are extended and retracted to and from both actors and infrastructures 
in order to advertise or request access to either resources or actions.  When an entity 
advertises that it has a capability, the diagram notation indicates that it extends a socket 
iconnector.  When an entity requests a resource, the diagram notation indicates that it 
extends a plug iconnector.  If a socket accepts a plug, the two iconnectors are said to bind 
and are drawn as such.   
Iconnectors can extend without the owner of the connection being aware of this 
event.  A ‘hidden’ iconnector might represent functionality on an infrastructure that is not 
an advertised capability.  For example, a buffer-overflow vulnerability on a server might 
be represented as a ‘hidden’ socket iconnector, with required tokens that represent 
knowledge of the vulnerability and skills required to exploit the vulnerability.  
Requirements to bind are always represented as tokens and are discussed below. 
2.   Iconnector Types – Sockets and Plugs 
There are two types of iconnector ends: sockets and plugs.  Sockets represent 
interfaces to access resources and actions– a means to achieve goals.  When an agent 
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requires a resource or action, it extends a plug iconnector and requests to bind to a socket.  
If a socket exists that matches the plug parameters then the requesting agent binds to the 
resource or action.  The sockets and plugs match the producer and consumer types on 




Figure 15.  Socket and Plugs depicted graphically. 
Socket labels differ from plug labels only in their use of tokens.  The tokens listed 
on a socket (Tsocket) are the required tokens that must be presented to bind to this socket.  
The tokens listed on a plug  (Tplug) are the tokens available to the owner of the plug.   
Binding to a socket simulates the plug owner’s desire to access the requested 
resource.  The initiator must posses all of the required tokens in order to make this 
binding (Tsocket ⊆ Tplug).  Equation 10 depicts the requirements to bind mathematically. 
Given: 
 plug cp = <lp, ep, sp, cap, ACp, tp |lp = <np, TPp>> 
socket cs = <ls, es, ss, cas, ACp tp |ls = <ns, TPs>>,  
a binding occurs iff: 
np = ns     //names must match 
Tp⊆ Ts   
sp= ss = extended 
cap > 0,  cas > 0 
                                                           and neither is currently bound 
tp = plug, ts = socket 
Equation 10.  The binding of a Socket to a Plug iconnector. 
3. Iconnector Cardinality 
Iconnectors have a cardinality that specifies the number of iconnectors that can 
simultaneously be bound to this particular iconnector.  An iconnector without a 
cardinality label has a default cardinality of one.  An iconnector with a cardinality of zero 
represents a special type of iconnector called a Listening iconnector (see Section IV.D.5). 











listening -- zero connections 0
< ni, Tx>
 
Figure 16.  Socket cardinality diagramming convention. 
4.   Iconnector Labels  
Iconnectors are depicted with one end as a socket or plug iconnector and the other 
end intersecting one edge of the owning entity.  See Figure 17 for a depiction of an 
actor’s plug iconnector attempting to bind to an infrastructure’s socket.   
bob enterprise
corp_database
socket = <name, {required tokens}>plug = <name, {available tokens}>  
Figure 17.  An Actor Plug attempting to bind to an Infrastructure Socket 
Iconnector. 
If a plug iconnector with all of the prerequisite tokens is presented to a socket 
iconnector, then they bind and actions may result.   
5. Listening Iconnector 
A listening iconnector is used in situations where an infrastructure or actor wants 
to be notified that a iconnector exists in the society, but does not wish to bind to this 
iconnector.  This may occur, for example, when an agent wants to know if a particular 
resource exists and is available on an infrastructure.  If a listener iconnector discovers the 
requested iconnector, the owning actor is notified of the iconnector on the entity, without 
the entity being notified of the actor’s query. 
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Listener iconnectors can be distinguished from other iconnectors by the 
cardinality label of zero.  Figure 18 (a) depicts a listener plug iconnector that notifies the 
actor if a socket becomes available that matches the listener’s label.  Figure 18 (b) depicts 
an infrastructure that will extend a iconnector cy if an entity extends a plug that matches 
the socket iconnector cx.  The mediating ibinder (not shown) takes care of the underlying 











(a)                                                                        (b)  
Figure 18. Listening Iconnectors. 
5. Actions 
Actions represent the effects of successfully accessing an infrastructure or actor 
through an interface.  There are three types of actions: 
• resource action  
• connection action 
• message transfer 
 
Resource actions represent the access of a critical information resource.  
Connection actions represent a modification to the interface of an infrastructure.  
Message transfers represent an entity providing potentially additional capabilities to other 
entities.  All actions are depicted graphically as dashed, directed lines, called action lines. 
a. Resource Action 
Resource actions are depicted graphically as dashed lines that intersect an 
owning iconnector inside an owning entity with an arrowhead on the other end of the 




lra = <mode|mode∈ {r,w}> 
where r = read access and w = write access 
Equation 11.  A Resource Action definition. 
When an entity binds to an iconnector that has a resource action attached, 
the iconnector is now accessing the resource in the mode indicated by the action label.  
When the entity disconnects from the iconnector it is no longer accessing the resource.  
This action represents an entity accessing information resources. 
b. Connection Action 
Connection actions are depicted graphically as dashed lines that intersect 
an iconnector inside an owning entity with the arrowhead on the other end of the action 
line pointing to the iconnector that is affected by the binding.  The connection action line 
has a label lca: 
lca =<s1, s2> where s1, s2 ∈ {∅, e, r} 
where ∅ = no action, e= extend, r = retract 
Equation 12.  A Connection Action definition. 
A label is placed by the arrowhead with the double <s1, s2>.  The value of 
s1 is the effect to the iconnector pointed to, when the owning iconnector becomes bound.  
Likewise, s2 is the effect on disconnecting, where the effect is null, extends, or retracts 
respectively.  An iconnector that is given the action to extend or retract, and is already 
extended or retracted respectively, will not perform any action.  The action connection 
represents a modification to an infrastructure interface that can occur when an entity 
successfully connects to the infrastructure. 
Figure 19(a) depicts a condition where an iconnector cy is by default 
retracted, and therefore the resource r1 is not accessible.  If a successful binding occurs to 
iconnector cx, then the connection action on cx will execute, causing cy to extend.  This 
state is depicted in Figure 19(b).  If an entity binds to cy at this point, cy will execute its 
resource action resulting in read access to resource r1.  On disconnecting from cx, the 


















Figure 19.  Actor ak binding to an Iconnector and a different  
Iconnector reacting by extending. 
Multiple iconnectors can be combined to react to each other as in Figure 
20.  This diagram depicts a condition where, if either socket iconnector is bound, the 
other retracts.  This example depicts a binding to resource ri if token ti or tj is presented.  
Upon binding to one of the sockets the other socket  retracts through the iconnector 
action command.  In this example, if an entity extended a plug with ti and tj tokens, the 
plug can bind to either one of the sockets (a stochastic choice make by the ibinder), and 
the other socket then retracts. 







Figure 20.  Connectors that permit Token ti or tj. 
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c. Message Transfer 
In some situations, an iconnector binding causes an entity to transfer an 
object to the other party of the binding.  The transfer message, hereafter referred to as a 
message, facilitates the exchange of tokens and capabilities between entities.  A transfer 
message is depicted graphically as a ‘lightning bolt’ arrow, with the base of the arrow 
touching a token or ticket that is transferred, and the head of the arrow pointing toward 
the destination entity of the message.   
A transfer message is a one-way, directed communication between 
entities.  A source entity specifies the destination entity and the contents of the message, 
consisting of tokens and/or tickets (discussed in Chapter V).   
Figure 21 (a) depicts an example of a message from an infrastructure.  If 
an entity binds to socket c1, an action causes the message containing ticket tk1 to be sent 
to the entity that bound to c1.  Figure 21(b) is similar.  If an entity binds to c2, the actor 







m1 m2  
Figure 21. An Infrastructure and an Actor with transfer messages. 
Messages convert the owner of a message into a vendor, who can transfer 
tokens and tickets to other entities.  The receiver of the message can choose to accept this 
message, in which case the receiver now possesses this new capability, or ignore the 
message. 
E. SOCKET AND PLUG CONNECTIONS  
The socket and plug mechanism can best be explained by an example.   
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Figure 22 is a sequence diagram that depicts the interactions that take place 
between two entities that extend iconnectors to the ibinder, and then later one of the 
iconnectors retracts.  The diagram depicts the following high-level events: 
1. entity1, an Entity creates a Socket, and calls its extendConnector 
method() which changes the Socket’s state to extended.  
2. The Socket notifies the IBinder that its state has changed, and the IBinder 
registers the Socket as an active socket connector. 
3. entity2 creates a Plug, and calls it’s extendConnector method() which 
changes the Plug’s state to extended. 
4. The Plug notifies the IBinder that it’s state has changed, and the IBinder 
registers that Socket as an active plug connector.  Next, the IBinder checks 
if the two sockets are compatible, which they are.  
1. The IBinder calls the Socket’s connect() method, notifying the 
Socket that it has connected to Plug. 
2. The Socket calls all of its actions that execute once a connection has 
been made. 
3. The IBinder calls the Plug’s connect() method, notifying the Plug 
that it has connected to the Socket. 
4. The Plug calls all of its actions that execute once a connection has 
been made. 
5. At this the point two entities are bound through their respective 
iconnectors.  These entities may now communicate directly. 
6. Next after some activity, entity1 decides that it no longer needs to be 
connected, and calls the Socket’s retractConnector() method. 
7. The Socket changes it’s state to retracted, and notifies the IBinder.   
8. The IBinder removes the Socket as an active iconnector and notifies the 
Iconnector that the Socket is no longer connected, by calling the Socket’s 
disconnect() method.   




9. The IBinder notifies the Plug that the Plug is no longer connected, by 
calling the Plug’s disconnect() method.   
• The Plug calls all of its actions that execute when a connection is 
broken. 
10. The IBinder attempts to reconnect the Plug to an existing the Socket 










































Figure 22.  A sequence diagram of Socket and Plug connecting and 
disconnecting over time. 
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F.   SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced the concept of iconnectors.  Throughout the chapter the 
actors and infrastructures, as depicted in Chapter III, were presented in the iconnector 
notation.  The concept of iconnectors permits the model depicted in Chapter III to 
implemented as a software simulation system.  
The infrastructure components were presented in this chapter in a connector 
notation.  Actors were presented at the interface level, but their reasoning is still a black 
box. 
The subsequent chapter describes an implementation of actors for a multi-agent 
implementation of the computational model of IA.  This implementation presents a 
connector-based agent architecture that permits the software actors to reason and interact 
with elements in the society. 
Next, an evaluation of this model is conducted by mapping the connector-based 
model to an empirical IA model.  This is followed by a detailed discussion of mapping 
actual and theoretical IA incidents to this model, and a description of their 
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V. THE STIAM CONNECTOR-BASED AGENT ARCHITECTURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces agent technology.  Agents are used in this dissertation to 
represent actors in the IA model.  Next, the connector-based agent architecture is 
introduced.  This is followed by an introduction to the agent’s internal mechanisms, 
followed by the agent’s role set and goal structure.  Finally, the agent’s capability set and 
behavior moderators are introduced.   
B. OVERVIEW 
Multi-agent simulations consist of numerous high-level autonomous software 
entities, called agents, operating in a common, shared environment.  The agents in this 
“outer environment” interact with one another and the objects in the environment.  They 
sense their environment, interpret the sensory input and make decisions as to what actions 
to perform.  These actions in turn affect the environment either directly through agent-to-
environment interactions or indirectly through agent-to-agent interaction.  Figure 23 
depicts these situated autonomous agents that interact with other agents and objects in an 




Figure 23.  Agents and Objects operating in an external environment. 
When building macro-level simulations with these agents, researchers are not 
interested in modeling cognitive behavior per se; they are interested in how the 
environment operates as a whole, i.e. as the sum of many parts.  Complex, cognitive 
agents that simulate human reasoning are not appropriate for this level of abstraction 
[Axelrod, 1997].  Instead, “cognitively limited” [Prietula, 1998] software agents whose 
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scope is restricted and whose outward behavior appears intelligent are employed.  This 
abstraction allows researchers and analysts to gain insight into the evolutionary pattern of 
the entire simulation environment, while making a complex domain, such as IA, tractable 
and manageable.   
This chapter introduces the agent architecture developed for STIAM.  These 
agents combine the Composite Agent architecture proposed by John Hiles [Hiles et al., 
2001] with connectors.  In Chapter IV iconnectors are shown to be an inter-agent 
communications mechanism, in contrast to connectors which are an intra-agent 
communications mechanism that allows software agents to bring appropriate actions to 
bear at the right time and in the proper context.  The connector-based agent architecture 
facilitates the building of relatively simple agents with the following characteristics:  
1. They can perform actions that appear intelligent.  
2. They can interact with objects. 
3. They can interact with each other. 
Thus, connector-based agents are used to simulate the actors in the society, as 
discussed in Chapter III and IV.  
C. CONNECTOR-BASED AGENT ARCHITECTURE 
There are six defining characteristics of the connector-based agent architecture: 
1. Agents are reactive, in that they respond to inputs from the environment 
without any deep reasoning. 
2. Agent goals, actions, and tokens are a function of the roles the agent is 
assigned. 
3. Agent decision-making is performed through a dynamic goal management 
apparatus that allows each agent to prioritize its goals and perform actions 
to pursue its highest priority goal or goals based on its perception of the 
environment. 
4. Procedural problem solving and action selection are handled by a request-
response mediation structure called tickets.  This structure not only 
permits the utilization of doctrinally correct procedures, but also allows 
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dynamic binding of actions based on context using strongly and 
semantically typed connectors. 
5. All sensors and effectors for the agent are performed through iconnectors 
and resource messages as discussed in Chapter IV.  All actions and 
messages within the agent are performed through a data structure called 
connectors. 
6. A set of behavior moderators has been added to create outwardly 
observable differences in agent behavior among otherwise homogeneous 
agents. 
The connector-based agent ai, developed to obtain the above six characteristics, 
has the following components: 
ai = < ei, Ri, Gi, Ti, Ki, BMi > 
where: 
ei –  A dynamic internal environment of connectors 
Ri – Role set 
Gi– Goal set with appropriate tickets and actions 
Ti – Token set  
Ki –Knowledge set of dynamic tickets  
BMi – Behavior Moderators 
Equation 13.  The Connector-Based Agent Specification. 
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Ti          token set (resources and access rights) 
Ki knowledge set 
BMi behavior moderators
Gi set of goals




Internal connector  
Figure 24.  The components of a connector-based agent and their interactions. 
 
D. CONNECTORS AND THE INNER ENVIRONMENT 
Just as entities in a society share a common outer environment, components 
within an agent share a common inner environment, ei.  Similarly, as entities in a society 
communicate using iconnectors, entities within the agent communicate with a similar, yet 
simpler mechanism, connectors.  In implementation, a Binder object is created that 




Figure 25.  Connector-based agent in an external environment. 
 
Connectors are active objects that sense and react to an environment, just like 
sockets and plugs in the outer environment.  As the agent’s inner environment changes, 
the connectors sense the changes and activate by extending (or deactivate by retracting) 
in ei.  By attaching connectors to various elements within the agent, the connectors signal 
the element’s state of readiness and level of fitness in the current context to other 
interested internal elements. 
Connectors are significantly simpler than iconnectors.  Connectors don’t have a 
concept of producers or consumers, nor sockets and plugs.  A connector extends into ei 
and broadcasts a value.  Another connector may extend into ei listening for a value.  If the 
broadcaster and listener match, then they bind.  The connector is defined by: 
ici = < l, s | l∈ L, s∈ S> 
where: 
L={l, v | l = connector label, v = connector value} 
S = {extended, retracted} 
Equation 14.  Connectors consist of a Label and State. 
The role of ei is not unlike iBinder; meaning that it acts like an internal 
switchboard that transcends and binds all agent internal components through these 
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connectors.  Components within an agent create connectors, which they extend into ei.  
Each connector has a label that declares its symbolic type.  This extension into ei of a 
connector with a label therefore signifies an interest in this label.  If two components 
extend connectors with matching labels, then the connectors are of the same type, and the 
connectors are said to bind.  When connectors bind, the agent components that created 
the connectors are notified of the binding and the other component that is party to the 
binding.  The components are also notified whenever the connectors’ state or value 
changes.  This simple notification mechanism is a powerful tool for binding the internal 







Figure 26.  Internal components with connectors extended  into ei. 
Connectors bind all of the internal components of the agent, as discussed 
throughout this chapter. 
E. ROLE SET – Ri 
The set Ri is the set of all Organizational Roles to which an agent ai is committed 
at a moment in time.  Each role is defined by a set of one or more goals and capabilities 
that are specific to the role’s behavior or function.  As depicted in Figure 24, when an 
agent commits to a role, it receives a set of goals and capabilities that are then added to 
the actor’s current sets.   
F.   GOALS - Gi 
A goal represents an activity an agent performs to further a role.  The set Gi is the 
set of all goals from all roles assigned to Actor ai. 
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At any given time there are numerous goals competing for the agent’s attention.  
Just as humans have multiple, sometimes conflicting goals, an agent too has multiple 
goals it wishes to satisfy.  In human decision-making goals are constantly shifting in 
priority based on the person’s context and state.  Klein (1989) showed that experts spend 
little time generating and analyzing possible courses of action.  Rather, they focus on 
situational awareness, and once a situation is recognized, they execute actions in a 
reactionary manner.  Agents can mimic the flexibility and substitution skills of human 
decision-making using a variable goal management apparatus within the agent.  It is from 
this goal apparatus where contextually appropriate, intelligent behavior emerges.   
1. Goal Structure 
A goal has five components:  
gi = < s, mm, w, tp, AC> 
where: 
s = state ∈ {inactive, critical, ready, active} 
mm = measurement method 
w = weight 
tp = threshold pair 
AC = action set for achieving the goal 
Equation 15.  A goal definition. 
Each of these components is discussed below. 
a. Goal state 
The goal state indicates the current condition of the agent’s goal.  The goal 
state may be one of these four enumerated values: 
• Inactive – the goal is currently not considered important to work 
toward. 
• Critical – the goal is considered important, but there are no actions 
that can be performed to pursue the goal.  
• Ready – The goal is critical, and there are actions the agent can 
perform to pursue this goal, but the goal has not been selected for 
execution. 
• Active – the goal is critical and an action is currently being performed 
to pursue the goal. 
The use of goals and goal state transitions are discussed in detail in 
Chapter V. Section F.1.e. entitled “Goal Action Set. ” 
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b. Measurement Method 
Agents need a way to determine if a goal is critical, i.e., should the agent 
spend resources pursuing the goal.  This is accomplished through the measurement 
method.  The measurement method translates the sensory input received by the goal into 
a quantifiable measure of the “criticality” of a goal at that instant in time.  The 
measurement method typically uses an algebraic formula and returns a measurement 
value.  The lower the measurement value, the less the agent is satisfying that goal, and 
the more important the goal is to the agent at that moment in time.  This dynamic 
measurement of goal satisfaction permits prioritization and adjustment of goal states 
based on context.   
Goals can be conceptually thought of as active entities.  These entities 
may have connectors listening to ei that observe the internal state of the actor.  These 
entities may also have external sockets, plugs, or listener iconnectors that extend into the 
outer environment.  From these internal and external connectors the goal measurement 










Figure 27. A goal receives input from ei and the outer environment, and produces a 
state, measure, and actions that effect the outer environment. 
c. Weight 
The goal weight is a relatively static, quantifiable value indicating the 
importance of the goal to the agent over time.  For example, a particular system 
administrator agent may believe that a goal of “protecting organizational information” is 
more important than “providing user functionality,” and therefore the first goal will have 
a higher weight than the second. 
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Goal weights may be modified by having special goal actions adjust the 
goal weights.  This may simulate an agent attending training, or experience in a field.  
For example, a system administrator agent may perform an action of attend security 
training that reinforces the importance of security in day-to-day activities, so the agent’s 
goal weight of protecting organizational information may be increased.  
To contrast, a measurement value is highly dynamic, possibly changing at 
every simulation cycle.  The measurement value is a measure of the actor belief that this 
goal currently needs attention. 
d. Trigger Threshold and Reset Threshold 
The threshold pair consists of a trigger threshold and a reset threshold.  
Figure 28 depicts an example where a goal measurement value drops below the trigger 
threshold at (a), changing the goal state to critical.  The goal remains critical until it 
passes above the reset threshold at (b), where it becomes inactive once more.As 
demonstrated in Figure 28, when a goal’s measurement value drops below the trigger 
threshold, the goal becomes critical.  The goal remains critical until the value rises above 
the reset threshold.  This threshold pair provides a simple means for an actor to commit to 
a goal [Wooldridge, 2000].  Commitment provides a simple implementation of intent, or 













Figure 28.  STIAM goal trigger and reset thresholds. 
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e. Goal Action Set 
Tied to each goal is a set of actions that an agent can follow for achieving 
the goals.  Actions are prioritized based on the current perception of the environment.  
When an appropriate goal is selected for pursuit, appropriate actions are selected for 
execution.  The actual method used for action selection can vary and is discussed later. 
When a goal becomes critical, it indicates that the actor needs to pay 
attention to this goal.  The goal apparatus examines the goal’s action set.  If an action 
exists that can be fired immediately, then the goal state becomes ready.  If the goal is 
actually selected for execution, the goal state becomes active and actions are executed 
attempting to fulfill the goal. 
The allowed goal states and their state transitions are depicted in Figure 29 


















Figure 29.  Actor goal state transitions. 
Goal switching based on a dynamically changing environment can produce 
innovative and adaptive behavior [Hiles et al., 2001]; however, it is desirable to constrain 
goal switching with doctrinally correct and appropriate actions.  This constraint is 
achieved through the encoding of procedural knowledge in a data structure called tickets.  




2. Goal Manager 
Goals are managed through an Actor Goal Manager (AGM).  During each 
simulation cycle the AGM polls the goals and receives the set of goals that are in the 
ready state.  For each ready goal received, the AGM examines its weight and then 
executes the next action of the ready goal having the highest weight.   
A goal may have more than one action that must be performed sequentially to 
satisfy the goal and have it return to an inactive state.  In this case, the goal becomes the 
active goal, and continues to execute actions during the agent’s execution cycles until it 
has no further action to perform, is no longer critical, or is interrupted.    An example 
implementation of an AGM with its corresponding goal selection procedure activity 
diagram is presented in Chapter VII, Section B.3. 
The AGM may cause an interruption in the currently active goal and that goal’s 
active action.  A goal may preempt the currently active goal and action if the AGM 
determines that this new goal has a higher weight than the currently active goal.   
The action set can be thought of as a set of possible solutions for achieving the 
goal.  Thus, when an agent has committed to a goal, it must then select the best means for 
pursuing that goal. 
Figure 30 depicts a snapshot of an AGM’s state at a moment in time.  Each row in 
the table represents a goal and the last entry in the row, labeled Action Tickets, contains 
pointers to action objects.  The actions tied to each goal have a Boolean ready label 
indicating whether the action’s prerequisites have been met.  Goal G4 is the active goal.  
Prior to becoming the active goal, it had the highest weight of any goal that was in the 
critical state, and had a ready action in its action set.  Goal G1 is ready, in that it is 
critical and has a ready action it can perform if given the opportunity.  Goal G5 is critical, 
but does not have an action it can perform at this time.  Goals G2 is inactive: it has an 
action it can perform, but G2 is not a critical goal.  Goal G3 is above the trigger and reset 
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Figure 30.  A snap-shot of a typical actor’s goals. 
3.   Action Set – Tickets and Frames 
In order to provide agents with a rich base of procedural knowledge while flexibly 
supporting adaptive behavior, a data structure called tickets was developed [Hiles et al., 
2001].  Tickets allow agents to apply procedural knowledge in context.  Tickets define 
the agent’s action set, i.e., its means to achieve its goals.  They are used to organize 
procedural knowledge and provide the ability to balance doctrinal behavior with adaptive, 
innovative action, resulting in enriched problem-solving behavior.   
The actions tied to the agent’s goals are actually tickets that define how to achieve 
the goal.  Tickets are composed of one or more frames.  A frame can be thought of as a 
container that holds a problem-solving step for a ticket.  The frame may hold another 
ticket, an action to perform, or can be a slot that can dynamically link to an action or 
ticket at runtime.  Tickets are depicted graphically as a sequence of squares arranged 
horizontally, where each square represents a frame within the ticket.  As shown in Figure 
31, actions are depicted as independent squares, with connectors and iconnectors possibly 














Figure 31.  An example ticket. 
Tickets may have prerequisites or co-requisites that must be met in order for a 
ticket to be active.  The prerequisites are specific to each ticket, and may include 
connector values, possession of tokens, or external iconnectors that must be bound.  
When the AGM is determining a goal’s state, it queries the goal’s tickets to see if they are 
able to execute.  The ticket prerequisites are checked to determine if it is able to execute 
at that instant.  This may require a recursive call since tickets may need to check member 
frames that may themselves be composed of tickets, as depicted in the center “inner 
ticket” frame of Figure 31.  The prerequisite function checking returns true if the 
prerequisites of the ticket have been met.   
Each ticket has a measurement method.  This method returns a zero value if the 
ticket determines that its prerequisites have not been met.  If the prerequisites have been 
met, the ticket cycles through its frames and selects the next frame to execute, returning 
the measurement value of that frame. 
Tickets have a weight reflecting their perceived usefulness in solving the goal.  
The agent examines the set of tickets that have their prerequisites met, and selects the one 
with the highest weight. 
Tickets can have two types of frames: static and dynamic. 
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a. Static Frame 
A static frame is a hard-coded, predefined problem-solving step within a 
ticket.  These frames can be thought of as a phase in a doctrine, tactic, or procedure to 
solve a problem.  A static frame is functionally equivalent to a production, or if-then 
action rule, that may execute the conclusion (action) if the premise (prerequisite) 
evaluates to true.  
A static frame may hold a ticket or an action.  A ticket within a frame can 
represent a sub ticket, or a sub problem step within a larger problem.  An action in a 
frame is a behavior, activity, or tool execution that is performed by the actor.  These 
actions may cause effects to the agent, or another entity in the outer environment.  All 
actions are connectors or iconnectors that are extended or retracted from the action. 
b. Dynamic Frame 
Simply encoding procedural knowledge and linking it to various goals is 
not sufficient for creating robust behavior.  The desire is to apply the most appropriate 
procedures for a given situation.  In a dynamic, concurrent system, the “given situation” 
not only changes constantly, but also is complex, so the system designer can’t necessarily 
conceive of (or account for) every possible combination.  Therefore, the mechanism for 
determining the “most appropriate” procedures must be flexible and able to support the 
same level of complexity as the changing contexts of the dynamic system.  The ability to 
reference an action commensurate with the situation is provided by allowing connectors 
as components of dynamic frames. 
Connectors are created by dynamic frames and extended into the inner 
environment, ei.  The connector’s value represents requirements that must be met in order 
to bind a problem-solving step to a frame in a ticket.  This permits the ticket to 
dynamically bind an appropriate action at runtime based on the simulation context.  The 
tickets and actions that bind to these dynamic frames are stored in the agent’s Knowledge 
Set, and are discussed later. 
As an example, Figure 32 depicts a frame within a ticket tk1 that requires 
two connectors labeled c1 and c2.  Action i does not contain both prerequisite connectors, 
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so it can not bind.  Action j contains both prerequisite connectors so it may bind.  If ticket 
tk1 was selected for execution then action j is executed, resulting in iconnector c4 being 
















Figure 32.  A Ticket tki can dynamically bind to Actions j, but is not able to bind to 
action i. 
With the connectors continually reacting to the environment, behavioral 
and procedural knowledge (tickets) can bind at runtime to fit the context as it develops.  
This binding is based not only on the state of the environment, but also on the goals of 
the agent, its capabilities, and its social interactions with other agents.  In this way, the 
correct procedural knowledge can be brought to bear in the appropriate situation. 
G.   AGENT TOKENS AND KNOWLEDGE SET-- CAPABILITIES  
In addition to tickets attached to goals, the actor has several toolboxes from which 
additional resources may be retrieved.  These toolboxes consist of the token set and the 
knowledge set.  The elements in these toolboxes extend connectors into ei advertising 
their existence to the actor.  Dynamic frames are then able to bind to these capabilities in 
order to achieve their goals. 
1. Ti – Token Set  
The Actor’s tokens Ti represent the collection of all initial tokens, tokens received 
from roles, and tokens received from messages.  If a frame requires a token it extends a 
connector into the ei that will return an appropriate token if one exist in Ti.  Additionally, 
goals have access to the entire set of tokens for attaching to plug connectors being 
extended into the outer environment (as described in Chapter IV). 
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2. Ki – Knowledge Set  
The knowledge set Ki represents procedural problem solving capabilities and 
declarative knowledge that are able to bind to dynamic frames of agent tickets.  This 
knowledge set provides the actor with tickets and actions to be used to achieve a goal.  
Unlike the action sets defined with a ticket, the knowledge set elements bind to frames 
dynamically at runtime.  This is accomplished when a frame extends connectors into ei, 
and the inner environment ei returns an action from the knowledge set that matches the 
connectors. 
3. Agent Learning 
In some instances, we may wish to simulate an actor learning new skills or 
acquiring new capabilities.  Actor learning can be simulated through the dynamic 
addition of tickets and tokens during execution.  Adding tickets and tokens has the effect 
of increasing the agent’s capabilities and knowledge.  Learning is simulated by sending a 
message to an agent with the additional capabilities within the message.  The actor parses 
the message and adds the capabilities to the agent’s token set or knowledge set. 
In other cases, we may want an agent to autonomously improve its performance 
over time.  In this case, agents can discard tickets that do not further their goals, and 
increase the use of tickets that have proved successful in reaching goals.  This can be 
accomplished by observing ticket behavior and adjusting ticket weights when the agent 
observes that tickets succeed or fail.  This behavior serves as a simple reactive learning 
system where the agent learns from the environment, based on “what works” with no 
human expertise or intervention [Holland, 1996]. 
H. BEHAVIOR MODERATORS4 
The behavior moderators (BMs) are subtle differences in individual agents, 
represented as values that can cause changes in an actor’s behavior.  The rationale for 
including behavior moderators is to capture a variety of attributes needed for describing 
human actors in an IA environment.  The BMs are used by the goal apparatus to 
                                                          
4 The term behavior moderator is borrowed from [NRC, 1998]. 
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“personalize” the agent’s goal prioritization, thus creating outwardly observable 
differences in actor behavior. Researchers can adjust the agent’s personality, skill, and 
emotion values and observe how this changes the agent’s behavior.   
Three categories of BMs are included in a STIAM agent: observable personality, 
skills, and emotional state. 
1.   Observable Personality 
The agent’s Observable Personality values represent a relatively static set that 
defines that actor’s long-term behavior.  These values include propensities for risk, 
loyalty to organizations, ethics, and ambition. 
2. Skills 
Skills represent a highly abstract set of ability values that an actor possesses.  
These skills include organizational, social, information technology, security, and 
management skills.  
3. Emotional State 
The actor’s emotional state consists of a set of attributes that represent the actor’s 
current internal state or feelings at any instant in time.  These attributes include the 
agent’s feeling of loneliness, security, self-worth, excitement, and fatigue. 
Behavior moderators are initialized when an actor is created.  These moderators 
are implemented as connectors, and are extended into the actor’s inner environment.  An 
actor may have actions that modify the BMs based on sensor input, thereby simulating 
education, changes to emotions, etc.  These modified connectors alert components that 
are listening to the connector, causing effects internal to the agent. 
The primary use of the behavior moderators are as coefficients to specific goal 
and ticket weights.  BMs may bind to goals and tickets thereby modifying the actor’s goal 
and action selection, creating observable differences in otherwise homogeneous actors. 
The moderators selected do not represent a scientific coverage of possible 
moderators.  This is left for future work. 
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I. LIMITATIONS OF STIAM AGENTS 
The STIAM agent architecture as presented has several limitations:  the effects of 
linear problem solving and an inability to learn from success and failures. 
The early history of artificial intelligence produced numerous systems that 
suffered from linear problem solving, such as GPS [Newell and Simon, 1963] and 
STRIPS [Filkes and Nilsson, 1971].  These systems divided problems into sub problems 
and solved each sub problem.  Difficulties occur when a later sub problem undoes the 
effect of a previously solved sub problem.  ABSTRIPS overcame the difficulties of linear 
problem solving using a procedural net, where “a plan is a partial ordering of actions 
with respect to time” [Sacerdoti, 1974].  Since actions were not ordered sequentially, they 
could be executed in a way that overcame the linear problem.  Likewise, Sussman 
defined the “Prerequisite_Clobbers_Brother_Goal”, where a prerequisite of one goal 
causes the failure of another [Sussman, 1974].  Tickets and reactive actions have the 
potential to cause gridlock within a single agent or between two agents, whose actions 
cancel the effects of previous actions.   This difficulty was not addressed in the current 
connector-based model. 
Additionally, there is no learning or historic element in the STIAM agents.  This 
ability would permit the agent to learn from success and failure, and improve its 
capabilities over time.  Both of these challenges are left as future work. 
J. SUMMARY 
The connector-based architecture facilitates the creation of complex agent 
behavior through relatively simple components.  In later chapters, it is demonstrated that 
this relatively simple, reactive agent architecture can bring rich, complex adaptive 
behavior to the computational model of IA.  The simplicity of the agent allows 
researchers to focus their attention on the environment being simulated, and not on the 
implementation mechanism.   
Chapter VII provides implementation details of actors created for the 




VI.  MODEL VALIDATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a validation of the STIAM computational model as a 
hypothesis generator for organizational level IA.  While a hypothesis generator cannot 
predict with accuracy what will occur in an environment, they can be used to generate 
sequences of events that may possibly occur, and these sequences can be used to perform 
inductive reasoning about the environment under investigation.   
To validate STIAM, this chapter demonstrates that the STIAM model captures all 
of the vital characteristics to the field of IA.  A mapping of the elements and relationships 
of a security model based on empirical data of computer security incidents to STIAM is 
performed.   
Next, this chapter discusses the shortcomings of functional models and the 
advantages of the concurrent computational STIAM model.   
This chapter provides a validation of the computational model, demonstrating that 
the elements of the information assurance field can be adequately represented in STIAM. 
B. INFORMATION ASSURANCE AND HYPOTHESES GENERATORS 
1. Models and Simulations 
The term ‘model’ means different things to different people.  To some model 
refers to a physical reproduction of an entity or environment, such as a toy ship or a 
diorama.  To others, model represents an analytical specification of assumptions, 
definitions, and equations used to discuss a particular phenomenon or theory [Nelson, 
1998], such as Newtonian mechanics or computer system security properties [Bell and 
LaPadula, 1973], [Biba, 1977], and [Graham and Denning, 1972].   
For the remainder of this chapter, the term model refers to a computational model.  
A computational model is a specification of the key entities in an environment, along 
with their behaviors and interactions, which can be represented by a computer program to 
explore specific aspects of the environment.  A ‘simulation’ refers to a computer software 
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implementation of the model to observe an abstraction of the environment as specified in 
the model. 
2. Induction and Hypothesis Generation 
A hypothesis generator is a simulation that reveals possible events and situations 
that may occur in an environment based on assumptions in the model [Hodges and 
Dewar, 1992].  The hypothesis generator is a simulation using software representations of 
entities found in the real world that simulates how these entities interact.  A researcher 
uses inductive logic, reasoning from the specific to the general to generate theories about 
the world.  He examines the output of the simulation, looks for patterns, and generates 
hypotheses about the real world [Axelrod, 1997].  The researcher might then examine the 
real world to confirm or deny these hypotheses.  
Many of the generated hypotheses may be obvious.  When others cause the 
researcher “to be moved to learn something about the world, the model may then be said 
to provide insight by poking him (the researcher) to go look at something …” [Hodges 
and Dewar, 1992].  
A hypothesis generator may not actually create a hypothesis in the strict 
mathematical sense.  It may produce a series of events that the researcher can examine, 
and from this, the researcher can conjecture as to the likelihood of the events.  The 
researcher can then examine the real world and attempt to prove the conjecture, adding 
these new theories to the researcher’s collection of domain knowledge.  These theories 
may then be used by the researcher to further understand the environment [Axelrod, 
1997]. 
It is important to contrast a predictive simulation with a hypothesis generator.  
The outputs from a validated predictive simulation are potentially observable events or 
quantities where their predictive accuracy can be measured in a real environment 
[Hodges and Dewar, 1992].  For example, a validated predictive astronomy simulation 
may state that a planet X will be at position Y at time T.  A hypothesis generator on the 
other hand  “does not give power to see into the actual situation, only into the assertions 
embodied in the model…it does so not by revealing truth about the world, (but) by 
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revealing key features of it’s own assumptions and thereby causing its user to go learn 
whether those key assumptions are true.” [Hodges and Dewar, 1992].   
3. STIAM 
As stated earlier, STIAM is a hypothesis generator, not a predictive simulation.  
STIAM provides a means to create a computational system representing relevant IA 
characteristics that will help security analysts generate hypotheses and theories about the 
IA domain.   
The next section provides a mapping of a security model based on empirical data 
of computer security incidents to STIAM.  This mapping demonstrates that STIAM 
contains all of the elements and relationships contained in the empirical model.  This 
validates that STIAM can adequately model all of the elements found in the IA domain. 
C. EMPIRICAL MODEL OF INFORMATION ASSURANCE (IA)  
Various agencies and organizations collect data on information system security 
and cyber-crime incidents.  The most comprehensive, open-source collection of 
information has been compiled by the CERT/CC. 
1. CERT/CC 
The Computer Emergency Response Team/Coordination Center (CERT/CC) is a 
federally funded research and development center responsible for the study and handling 
of Internet security vulnerabilities and incidents [CERT, 2002].  Government and 
commercial entities report information system security incidents to the CERT/CC, and 
receive assistance in dealing with these incidents.     
Howard conducted an analysis of Internet incidents reported to the CERT/CC 
from 1989 to 1995.  He categorized the incidents, and from this developed a Taxonomy of 
Computer and Network Attacks [Howard, 1997].  This taxonomy provided coverage of all 
incidents in the CERT/CC database. 
The model he developed from this analysis is summarized in tabular form in 
Figure 33.  This model demonstrates how an attacker uses tools to provide access 








































































































































































































































































Figure 33.  Howard’s Computer and Network Attack Taxonomy, [Howard, 1997]. 
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Howard’s research was based on the Internet incident data of the CERT/CC.  As 
such, his taxonomy provides complete coverage of the CERT/CC database, but the 
database did not provide complete coverage of security incidents.  Any incidents that 
were not shared with the CERT/CC, did not involve the Internet, or that were not 
technical in nature were not included in the CERT/CC database. 
It has been observed that a large number of cyber attacks against government 
agencies and corporate organizations are not reported [Minehart, 1998].  For many 
organizations, reporting successful cyber attacks can damage the perception of the 
organization in the eyes of customers and clients.  In commercial enterprises, the 
“personal relationship with the customer is the most cherished asset”, [Minehart, 1998] 
and so reporting successful attacks against a corporate information infrastructure may 
damage the reputation of the corporation, and under most circumstances harm the 
corporate bottom line. Additionally, reporting security incidents can provide useful 
feedback to an attacker, possibly releasing additional technical details to the attacker 
[Minehart, 1998], and even inviting “copycat” attacks. 
The CERT/CC data also fails to account for the professional attacker.  
Professionals are differentiated from amateurs by the effort, cost, and sophistication of an 
attack5.  A professional can expend the funds and afford to wait for the right moment to 
attack, using sophisticated and nearly undetectable methods, such as the subversion6 of 
software.  For examples of this professional threat see [Myers, 1980], [Karger and Schell, 
1974], and [Anderson, 2002].  These attacks are nearly impossible to discover, and 
therefore are unlikely to be reported to the CERT/CC. 
In an effort to develop a more complete taxonomy of security incidents, Howard 
and Longstaff developed a model based not only on empirical data, but also on general 
observations and experience in the field of IA. 
                                                          
5 From a personal conversation with William Murray at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, California, December 2001. 
6 Subversion refers to the “covert and methodical undermining of internal and 
external controls over a system lifetime to allow unauthorized and undetected access to 
system resources and/or information.” [Myers, 1980]. 
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2. Enhanced Model 
Howard and Longstaff updated Howard’s original work to develop a “Common 
Language for Computer Security Incidents” [Howard and Longstaff, 1998].  This work 
developed a ”taxonomy of high-level terms and relationships to classify security 
incidents” [Howard and Longstaff, 1998].  This work added elements to Howard’s 
original work and provided additional coverage of security incidents based on their 
experience in the security community.  They added the ability to model physical and 
social attacks, rather than just logic-based attacks7.  They also modified the model, 
increasing its usefulness and complexity, by adding action and target categories.   
Howard and Longstaff’s goal was to “develop a minimum set of ‘high level’ 
terms, along with a structure indicating their relationships (a taxonomy), which can be 
used to classify and understand computer security incident information” [Howard and 
Longstaff, 1998].  Certainly any model that claims to represent IA must include these 














                                                          
7 Physical attacks refer to the theft, destruction, and/or damage of materials.  
Social attacks refer to manipulating individuals to achieve a goal.  Logical attacks refer to 












































































































































































































































































































































D.   MAPPING OF EMPIRICAL MODEL TO STIAM  
The following is a mapping of the elements of the Howard and Longstaff model, 
as shown in Figure 34, to STIAM.  This will demonstrate that STIAM contains a superset 
of the elements of this empirical model. 
1. Actors and Objectives 
Howard and Longstaff’s attackers and objectives represent a subset of the actors 
and goals in the IA environment.  Particularly, they are the individuals who perform 
malicious actions against computer systems.  As stated earlier, Howard and Longstaff’s 
seven ‘attackers’ provides a simple means/motive label at an instant in time.   
STIAM may include any actor goals that a researcher may feel is important, and 
as such, Howard and Longstaff’s attackers and objectives are included in STIAM. 
Additionally, actors not listed by Howard and Longstaff may perform actions that 
affect an organization’s information and systems.  An example is a benevolent individual 
who performs some action out of ignorance that inadvertently affects organizational 
information security adversely.  Thus, STIAM can model any malevolent actor (attacker), 
as well as  a wide variety of other actors, goals, and actions that can affect the IA of an 
organization. 
2. Tools 
Tools represent the means at the actor’s disposal to exploit an infrastructure or 
actor capability.  These can be represented in STIAM by tickets and frames in an actor’s 
knowledge pool that can extend iconnectors from the actor.  If an actor has a ticket or 
frame and a desire to utilize this ticket or frame within the context of an active goal, the 
actor extends the appropriate iconnector into the environment, representing the use of the 
tool.   
All of the tools are defined and discussed in Table 3 entitled “Mapping of Howard 
and Longstaff’s tools to STIAM”.  This table demonstrates how to model each tool 




Means Definition8 Implementation in STIAM 
Physical 
Attack 
A means of physically stealing or 
damaging a computer, network, its 
components, or its supporting systems 
(such as air conditioning, electrical 
power, etc) 
An infrastructure that is susceptible to a physical 
attack has a socket with tokens indicating 
appropriate physical proximity.  An actor who 
has these tokens and the desire and capability to 
perform a physical attack may extend a plug 
connector, causing the bound socket to effect the 
infrastructure.  A researcher may model a 




A means of obtaining information 
either from other attackers (such as 
through electronic bulletin boards), or 
from the people being attacked 
(commonly called social engineering) 
These are modeled as a plug connector that 
binds to an actor or infrastructure.  The binding 
results in a message being sent to the attacker 
that contains the newly acquired information.  
This information may be access rights, as tokens, 





Exploiting a vulnerability by entering 
commands to a process through direct 
user input …(or) through the 
execution of a file of commands 
(script) or a program at the process 
interface.  This also includes software 
packages, which contain scripts, 
programs, or agents to exploit 
vulnerabilities. 
These are modeled as a socket or plug connector 
between an actor and an infrastructure.  This 
may result in an infrastructure-to-infrastructure 
message or binding. 
Autonomous 
Agent 
A means of exploiting a vulnerability 
by using a program, or program 
fragment, which operates 
independently from a user (includes 
viruses and worms). 
An actor spawns a new ‘logical’ actor whose life 
span may be limited.  This child actor executes 
tickets assigned by the parent actor. 
Distributed 
Tool9 
A tool distributed to multiple hosts, 
which can then be coordinated to 
anonymously perform an attack on the 
target host simultaneously after some 
delay. 
Infrastructure(s) have sockets representing 
distributed tools.  A master sends a message to 
the zombie sockets causing a plug to extend 
representing the distributed tool.  This plug 
contains a token representing the number of 
simulated zombies participating in the attack.   
Data Tap A means of monitoring the 
…emanations from a computer or 
network using an external device. 
A socket on the infrastructure represents 
emanations; a plug from an actor represents the 
desire to monitor.  The binding causes a message 
to be sent from an infrastructure to an actor 
representing the interception of the new data, 
such as tokens. 
Table 2.  Mapping of Howard and Longstaff’s tools to STIAM. 
                                                          
8 The definitions are taken directly from [Howard and Longstaff, 1998]. 
9 A distributed attack typically has a ‘master’ who centrally controls multiple 
‘zombies’ on compromised hosts.  At the direction of the master, the zombies perform a 
coordinated attack against a designated ‘target’ host. 
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In addition to the malicious tools discussed in Howard and Longstaff, STIAM 
must deal with tools used by benign actors to simulate individuals performing non-
malicious actions.  Thus, Howard and Longstaff’s tools are a subset of all tools available 
to actors that can be represented in STIAM. 
It is important to realize that tools represent the means to an action, not the action 
itself.  As such, the tools represent a way to place an action on a target.  An action has 
utility only if a compatible connector for the action exists on the target. 
3. Vulnerability 
Infrastructures have an interface composed of iconnectors to which actors, having 
the appropriate iconnectors, can bind to perform actions.  This interface and the 
subsequent actions that occur upon binding to this interface define the functionality of the 
infrastructure.  Some of these capabilities are deliberate and known.  Others capabilities 
represent ‘unspecified functionalities’ or vulnerabilities -- “a weakness in a system 
allowing unauthorized actions” [Howard and Longstaff, 1998].  In the case of STIAM, 
vulnerabilities represent a subset of the sources of socket connectors.  Howard and 
Longstaff define three types of system vulnerabilities: design, implementation, and 
configuration of systems; similar to the design, implementation, and maintenance 
vulnerabilities described in [Myers, 1980]. 
A special hybrid vulnerability is a capability in a system caused by an incorrect 
policy specification.  The incorrect policy specification may cause an incorrect 
implementation or configuration of a system, creating a capability in the system not 
intended by the management, had they known of the inconsistency a priori.  While this 
incorrect specification might be caused by ignorance on the part of the management of 
the organization, we have chosen to place this vulnerability under design vulnerability.   
A design vulnerability is “a (capability) inherited in the design or specification 
of the hardware or software whereby a perfect implementation results in this 
(capability).” [Howard and Longstaff, 1998].  These vulnerabilities are typically 
attributed to engineers.  Real world examples include poorly written protocols, such as 
the TCP/IP protocol suite [Bellovin, 1989] and the wired equivalent privacy (WEP) 
protocol [Walker, 2000].   
 91 
 
An implementation vulnerability is  “a (capability) that results from an error 
made in hardware or software implementation of a satisfactory design.” [Howard and 
Longstaff, 1998].  These vulnerabilities may be the result of a coding or manufacturing 
error that accidentally introduces a flaw in the system [Karger and Schell, 1974].  As 
discussed earlier, professional attackers will try to deliberately subvert hardware or 
software at some point in a system’s lifecycle in order to install unspecified functionality 
to the system [Karger and Schell, 1974], [Brinkley and Schell, 1994], [Myers, 1980].  
A configuration vulnerability is a “(capability) resulting from a configuration of 
the system”  [Howard and Longstaff, 1998].  These vulnerabilities may arise due to an 
end user not modifying the default settings such as a default account or password, 
vulnerable services enabled or installed, or global write permissions on newly created 
files [Atkins et al., 1996].  Additionally these vulnerabilities may be introduced by 
system administrators or users who incorrectly install or configure software on a system 
such as accidentally inactivating protective measures and misconfigured routers or 
firewalls.   
When a researcher or analyst is building a model of a real enterprise 
infrastructure, they determine what the critical resources are within the enterprise.  Next, 
they examine the interfaces of both the resources and infrastructure, and determine how 
actors and other infrastructures can bind to this infrastructure, thereby defining the 
capabilities of the infrastructure.  Some of the interfaces and their effects on the model 
are deliberately planned in the real-world system.  Others are not, and these unplanned 
capabilities correspond to  the vulnerabilities as defined by Howard and Longstaff.   
Howard and Longstaff’s three categories provide a catalyst to the researcher’s 
thought process.  These vulnerabilities can be modeled in STIAM to help show the 
researcher the effect on the organization if these vulnerabilities are realized. 
While STIAM provides complete coverage of Howard and Longstaff’s 
vulnerabilities, Howard and Longstaff’s model fails to provide coverage for social 
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engineering10.  In STIAM, as discussed in Chapter IV, an ignorant actor will extend 
connectors out of ignorance and manipulative actors can take advantage of this ignorance 
to achieve their goals.  Thus, a fourth vulnerability is ignorance.  
4. Action 
An action represents a “step taken by a user or process in order to achieve a 
result”  [Howard and Longstaff, 1998].  In STIAM, an actor executes a tool from within a 
frame that extends an iconnector, and may bind to a targeted iconnector.  This binding 
may result in an action performed by the owner of that target iconnector.  Thus, tools are 
executed by the attacker, iconnectors may bind, and the resulting action is executed on 
another entity in the environment. 
  Howard and Longstaff define eight actions of interest in IA.  Due to the level of 
abstraction of STIAM, two of these actions, probe and scan, are combined. 
a. Probe/Scan  
Since the infrastructure represents the aggregate of all information 
processing capabilities and resources, probe and scan are combined to ‘determine 
characteristics of an infrastructure’.  A probe or scan of an infrastructure is modeled 
using a listening connector.  An actor extends the listening connector, and the actor is 
notified when a matching iconnector is discovered.  A probe/scan is initiated by an actor 
and operates on a society. 
b. Flood 
A flood is an overloading of an infrastructure capability, resulting in a 
potential denial of service (DOS).  Floods are modeled by a socket iconnector on an 
infrastructure, typically called a flood socket.  If an actor has the prerequisite tool that 
produced the appropriate plug connector, he can bind to this flood socket causing the 
retraction of appropriate iconnectors in the infrastructure, representing resources and 
processes that are no longer available.  It is important to keep in mind that when the actor 
                                                          
10 Social engineering refers to using nontechnical interpersonal deception to 
manipulate individuals into providing information in order to bypass security controls.  
See [Winkler, 1997] or [Parker, 1998]. 
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disconnects from the flood socket and discontinues flooding the infrastructure, 
appropriate restoration and reinitialization actions must take place on the infrastructure to 
reestablish capabilities as appropriate.  Figure 35 represents an infrastructure where an 
actor is able to perform a flood by binding to the flood socket.  This binding to the flood 
socket causes the resource socket to retract.  In this example, when the actor stops 
flooding, i.e. disconnects from the flood socket, the resource socket extends and the 







Figure 35.  A socket that represents flooding a resource.  Successfully binding to a 
flood disconnects (retracts) other iconnector. 
 
c. Authenticate 
Authentication represents “providing identification to a process (or actor) 
in order to have an identity verified in order to access a target”  [Howard and Longstaff, 
1998].  While all bindings can be thought of as an authentication, this action refers to 
authenticating an actor’s identity in order to receive additional access capability.  This 
can be modeled by an actor presenting some tokens to an authentication iconnector.  If 
the tokens are accepted, i.e. the actor actually binds to the iconnector, then the iconnector 
sends a message to the actor, providing an additional token that represents the successful 
authentication as in Figure 36.  Of course, an actor may provide false tokens to the 









Figure 36.  An Iconnector that replicates the authentication process. 
d. Bypass 
A bypass is “avoiding (the) security process by exploiting a vulnerability”  
[Howard and Longstaff, 1998].  Bypasses can be modeled in STIAM as an interface to a 
resource or infrastructure that does not require the typically necessary tokens.  An actor 
can bypass normal security if a vulnerability exists on the infrastructure, such as an 
operating system vulnerability, that can be exploited by a socket.   
Figure 37(a) illustrates a normal access method as modeled in STIAM.  
An actor binds to connector c1 to replicate the authentication process.  The infrastructure 
provides token Ti that can then be used with connector c2 to access resource r in the 
‘normal’ (i.e. authorized) manner of access.   
Figure 37 (b) illustrates a bypass action in STIAM.  An example of an 
operating system vulnerability is connector c3, that permits any actor read or write access 
to resource r, if they posses a token Tj, knowledge of the vulnerability.   
Figure 37(b) also illustrates a backdoor.  Typically, a backdoor must first 
be activated before it can be exploited.  The activation requires an individual to have 
special knowledge about activating the backdoor.  After the backdoor has been activated, 
an attacker needs special knowledge as to the process of accessing the backdoor to access 
the critical resources.  Connector c4 represents a backdoor installed in subverted software 
as an intentional, yet hidden socket that requires token Tl – knowledge of the backdoor.  
The backdoor is initially hidden, and cannot be accessed until an actor binds to c5, which 
requires token Tk, knowledge of backdoor activation method, to activate the backdoor.  













(a) (b)   
Figure 37. Bypass Actions in STIAM. 
e. Spoof11 
A spoof is nearly identical in implementation on STIAM as an 
authentication.  The only difference is that an entity uses tokens on a connector in an 
unauthorized manner in order to authenticate a false identity, thereby ‘tricking’ an 
authentication process. 
STIAM can model the four fundamental methods of spoofing: 
• Actor-to-Actor – An actor presents false tokens to another actor, 
thereby the attacker tricks the recipients of the spoof into believing the 
attacker is a different actor.  This may represent an example of social 
engineering. 
• Actor-to-Infrastructure – An actor presents false tokens to an 
infrastructure claiming to be another person in order to receive the 
other person’s access rights.  This may represent falsifying a system 
authorization process with acquired passwords or sending ‘spoofed’ 
email with a false ‘from’ address. 
• Infrastructure-to-Actor – A system claims to be another system to an 
actor.  A real world example is a computer system that does not have a 
trusted path12 implemented and permits a process to ‘pretend’ it is a 
legitimate logon screen in order to capture the user’s authentication 
tokens.   
                                                          
11 While there are conflicting definitions for spoofing, it is used here to mean “an 
active security attack in which a machine on the network masquerades as a different 
machine” [Howard and Longstaff, 1998]. 
12 A trusted path is a “mechanism by which a person at a  terminal  can  
communicate  directly with the (system protection mechanisms).  This mechanism can 
only be activated by the person or the (system protection mechanisms) and  cannot  be  
imitated  by untrusted software” [NSTISSC, 2000]. 
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• Infrastructure-to-Infrastructure – This represents a device spoofing 
another device.  This might represent a DNS spoof13, or configuring a 
false machine identity, such as an IP address. 
 
f. Read 
Reading is “obtain(ing) the content of data in a storage device...”  
[Howard and Longstaff, 1998].  In STIAM, reading is equivalent to binding to a resource, 
thereby obtaining the contents of the resource.  Reading a token or ticket is performed by 
binding to a socket and having a token or ticket sent to the actor by a message. 
g. Copy 
Copying is similar to reading, except that the act reproduces the data and 
leaves the original unchanged.  There are two fundamental types of copying.  The first is 
copying a ticket or token, which is performed by binding to a iconnector and receiving a 
message that contains the ticket or token.   
The second is copying a resource which is also similar to reading in that 
an actor binds to a iconnector, except here the actor receives a special token through a 
message.  This new token permits the actor to bind to a newly created resource socket 
that requires this new token. 
h. Delete 
Deleting a token or ticket results in the object being removed from the 
entity.  Deleting a resource causes all iconnectors to be retracted from the resource.  
Since  no active iconnectors remains, the resource is no longer available.  While it may 
seem that the resource should be removed from the infrastructure, this action is not 
supported in the basic STIAM model, and in some instances may  cause problems.  For 
example, Figure 38 below depicts an infrastructure that supports both delete and backup.  
When an actor binds to connector c1 a backup is performed on the resource and the actor 
receives token Ti.  When an actor binds to c2 the resource is deleted, perhaps maliciously, 
                                                          
13 A Domain Name Server (DNS) spoof is performed by sending a network router 
false network-address data, causing the device to route traffic incorrectly and undetected. 
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resulting in retraction of the resource iconnector c3.  If an actor has the token Ti, then he 
can bind to c4 and restore the resource from the backup, causing the resource connector 
to extend.   
r








Figure 38.  Deletion and backup  on STIAM. 
i. Steal 
Stealing is similar to a copy with an additional action – all other resource 
sockets that connect to a resource are retracted.  In effect, the actor has made a copy of 
the resource and forbids all others from binding.  Examples of a stealing action are 
copying data to a floppy disk and deleting the data from a system or stealing a notebook 
computer with a critical resource.  Stealing a token can be represented by copying the 
token, then deleting it from the original source.  Stealing a resource can be represented by 
copying the resource, then deleting the resource, as in (j) below, but retaining the new 
extended resource iconnector that was established by the copy. 
j. Modify 
Modifications occur when an actor writes (binds in a write mode) to a 
resource, in effect changing the version of a resource.  Some modifications are authorized 
and proper; other modifications are malicious.  While this is easy to implement in 
STIAM, there is no easy way to distinguish an unauthorized modification from an 




Targets are entities to which actions are directed.  While Howard and Longstaff 
defined seven types of targets (account, process, data, component, computer, network, 
internetwork), they also declare, “The first three are ‘logical’ entities and the other four 
are ‘physical’ entities”.  This matches nicely to STIAM’s concept of resources and 
infrastructures, respectively. 
In STIAM, ‘logical’ targets (account, process, data) are represented as resources, 
and ‘physical’ targets (component, computer, network, internet) as infrastructures.  
Howard and Longstaff imply that “logical entities” are computer accounts, computer 
programs in execution, and electronic data found on computer systems.  In STIAM, these 
are resources, and the STIAM concept of resources in not limited to electronic format.  
Resources may be in an electronic format, paper, human memory, or other formats.  
Thus, Howard and Longstaff’s logical entities are a subset of all resources in a society 
that can be represented in STIAM. 
Howard and Longstaff indirectly include social attacks.  A social attack against an 
ignorant individual may have an indirect goal of obtaining account information, but the 
target of the attack itself is on an individual, with the result being increased access.  Thus, 
a third category of target in STIAM is an actor. 
6. Result 
Howard and Longstaff define the “logical end of a successful attack” as the 
unauthorized result.  Example results follow. 
a. Increased Access 
Increased access results in an actor having the ability to bind  to additional 
actors, infrastructures, or resources.  This can occur because of additional sockets that 
have extended due to an action, or an actor receiving additional tokens or tickets from 
messages that permit additional bindings. 
b. Disclosure of Information 
This results in an actor actually binding to a resource for which he may be 
capable but not authorized. 
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c. Corruption of Information 
This results in modifying information – an unauthorized write mode 
binding to a resource.  An organization may have means in place to detect the corruption 
of information and resources.  This may be done with a cryptographic checksum, where a 
sender computes a checksum value for the information or resource, the receiver computes 
a checksum, and a comparison of these two values can determine if the information or 
resource has been modified.   
As stated earlier, an actor may desire and perform an act that causes an 
unauthorized write to a resource, but the effect may not be readily apparent from the 
graphical diagram, since authorized actors may perform unauthorized write actions that 
change data in an unauthorized way.   
Detecting this result requires the researcher to examine the actor’s goals 
and actions.  As stated earlier, if a researcher is modeling accidents in his scenarios, it 
may be impossible to distinguish some accidents from malicious acts by examining 
outward STIAM diagrams.  In the real world, it may be impossible to tell from 
observable evidence if an authorized end user incorrectly enters input values or 
accidentally deletes a corporate database.  Likewise, it may not be possible to tell if an 
actor corrupts an enterprise resource or performs a denial of service without examining 
the agent’s goal structure and actions.   
d. Denial of Service (DOS) 
This results in the retraction of socket connectors; thereby no other actor is 
capable of accessing the resource. 
e. Theft of Resources 
This results in an actor binding to an infrastructure when not authorized.  
The act could use the resource or tokens as a jumping off point for further attacks. 
7.   Summary 
The sections above demonstrate that all of the elements of a security model based 
on empirical data, and modified to take into account additional observations in the IA 
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environment, can be are mapped into the STIAM model.  Additionally, numerous 
additional elements have been identified that are modeled in STIAM, but are not 
described in the enhanced empirical model.  Thus, Table 4 shows that STIAM is a 





Howard and Longstaff STIAM 
Actors  “Individuals who attack a 
computer to achieve a 
(malicious) objective” 
Includes all relevant actors in the 
environment, including benign actors. 
Objectives “The purpose or end goal 
of an incident” driven by 
the actor type...static 
Includes relevant goals an actor may have 
based on various assigned roles.  These 
change over time as the actors state and 
roles change. 
Tools “Means of exploiting a 
computer or network 
vulnerability” 
These tickets and frames are means to 
access an actor or infrastructure to achieve 
their goals. 
Vulnerability “A weakness in a system 
allowing unauthorized 
actions” 
Includes all sources of capabilities on an 
actor or infrastructure, including ignorance.   
Action “A step taken by a user or 
process in order to 
achieve a result” 
An event that occurs as the result of a 
binding includes malicious acts as well as 
routine actions that affect the actors, 
resources, and infrastructures of a society. 
Target “A computer or network 
logical entity or physical 
entity” 
Includes all of these targets, in addition to 
social targets (other actors). 
Result “The logical end of a 
successful attack” 
 
These are the high level interpretations of 
bindings and messages that result from tools 
being deployed. 
Table 3.  Comparison of key components in Howard and Longstaff model and the 
STIAM model. 
E.   INFORMATION ASSURANCE (IA) AS A CONCURRENT SYSTEM 
Howard and Longstaff's taxonomy accepts a static finite set of inputs and 
provides a mapping to a static finite set of outputs.  
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F(i) = o  
where : 
i ∈ {attacker × objective × tool × system vulnerability} 
o ∈ {action × target × result} 
Equation 16.  Howard and Longstaff’s Functional Model. 
Systems like these are referred to as functional, or relational, systems 
[Wooldridge, 2000]. 
Concurrent systems on the other hand cannot be expressed by a function [Pnueli, 
1986].  In a concurrent system, each entity in the system can sense and independently 
react to the environment, which consists of other reacting entities [Pnueli, 1986].  Unlike 
a function that computes some value from a set of inputs and halts, the concurrent 
system’s collection of autonomous entities react to each other continuously.  Thus, for a 
given input, it may not be possible to determine an output a priori.  The entities in a 
concurrent system must be described in relation to the entity’s current state and the state 
of the surrounding environment.  
The IA environment is thus a concurrent system.  Actors operate continuously, 
choosing local actions to perform based on their perception of the environment.  
Infrastructures and resources are modified by individual actors without other actors’ 
knowledge, providing functionality unknown to the users of the resources.   
While at any point each actor has a finite set of actions it can choose from, the 
actor bases the choice of which action to perform on the observed actions of other actors, 
and its beliefs about the actions of other actors.  The actor can then adjust beliefs and 
choose another action to perform based on his chosen actions, and the actions and 
reactions of the other actors   [Wooldridge, 2000].  Therefore, a comprehensive model of 
IA should not be expressed as a functional model. 
STIAM provides an expressiveness not found in functional models.  First, STIAM 
provides a graphical representation of the instantaneous states of the actors and the 
environment.  This instantaneous state description provides the value of the infrastructure 
and resource state, in direct comparison with the actor’s goals and actions.  Second, by 
viewing the changes in the environment over time, an analyst can get a clearer picture of 
the dynamic environment.  This graphical discovery over time allows the observation of 
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the evolutionary patterns in the environment.  These patterns may provide further insight 
into where observers need to look in the real environment. 
Thus, STIAM can provide a graphical expressiveness with concurrency support 
that is not possible in sequential functional models.  These strengths aid in understanding 
not only the elements and their interactions, but also where the environment capabilities 
and vulnerabilities may evolve as a whole. 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter explains that it is possible to produce a hypothesis generator and 
validate this against empirical evidence and experience in the field.  The STIAM model 
accounts for the information assurance elements as identified by empirical evidence.  As 
such, this chapter provides validation of the hypothesis that the STIAM model and 
simulation can model the IA environment at the organizational level.   
Additionally, STIAM is more general purpose than technology-centric models.  
This generality provides STIAM with the ability to model benign actors, ignorance, and 
other aspects of organizations, and to examine how these can adversely affect the 
assurance of an organization’s information and information systems. 
The descriptive model provides a means of graphically representing the highly 
complex domain of IA as a concurrent model.  This graphical representation provides 
additional expressiveness not found in traditional functional models, and aids in 
examining much more complex environments than possible using functional models.   
The next chapter presents an implementation of STIAM as a computational 
system.  This system provides researchers with an artificial environment in which to 
examine the effects of various system and personal vulnerabilities on the information and 
information systems of an organization.  This chapter presents an implementation of 
several situations that can be encountered in the IA domain.  These situations were 





 VII. EXAMPLE SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a proof-of-principle implementation of STIAM.  Using this 
implementation, several small scenarios were developed and encoded to evaluate the 
model and the software system.  Developing the software system provided an abundance 
of insight into the challenges of IA modeling and multi-agent system (MAS) 
development.   
This chapter begins by introducing the software packages and diagrams, and the 
system flow for key algorithms.  This includes a simulation engine and utilities that were 
developed to manage the objects and agents in this multi-agent simulation.  It also 
includes the specification of the entities, actor agents, and scenarios needed to run the 
simulation.   
Chapter VIII introduces scenarios that were implemented, an analysis of these 
scenarios, and a discussion of the significant insight gained from their implementation. 
Package and class diagrams are provided in UML.  Names of packages and 
classes are annotated with fixed-width font.  Class diagrams are presented 
graphically using Jvision, version 1.2 from Object Insight (http://www.object-
insight.com). 
B. SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTATION 
This implementation of STIAM was developed as a Java application.  Java was 
chosen because of its platform independence, memory management, strict type checking, 
and object-oriented design, making it a good prototype language.  
A total of six packages were developed.  The packages are: 
• simsecurity – contains the simulation engine called SimManager that 
loads simulation scenarios, build the GUI, and executes the main 
simulation thread.  This package also contains the Token class that is used 
across all packages. 
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• entity – contains the Entity class, along with the specialized child 
classes: Infrastructure and Resource. 
• actor – contains the Actor class and its component classes, such as 
Role, Goal, Ticket. 
• connectors – contains the Connector and IConnector classes, along 
with their respective Binder, IBinder, Socket and Plug, and 
Action classes. 
• scenarios – contains XML scenario files and specialized Actor and 
Infrastructure classes for use in these scenarios. 
•  utilities – contains basic programming utilities, and data structures 
necessary for the simulations 
Each of these packages are presented below in Figure 39.  In this implementation, 
organizations were not explicitly implemented; rather, roles were assigned to actors and 




Figure 39.  The package diagram for an implementation of STIAM. 
1.   SimSecurity Package 
The simsecurity package contains the scenarios, connector, and 
entity package, as depicted in Figure 39.  Since all of the packages use tokens, the 
Token class is a component of the simsecurity package. 
SimManager is a singleton class that manages the simulation.  The SimManager 
creates the graphic user interface (GUI), loads a scenario file, instantiates all of the 
entities declared in the scenario file, and executes the simulation as a single thread.  This 



































Figure 40.SimManager builds the GUI, loads a scenario, and repetitively loops 
through all of the Actors. 
Scenarios represent defined societies that are represented within the simulation 
software.  Scenarios files are encoded using a customized document type-definition 
schema for the Extensible Markup Language (XML).  Actor and Infrastructure objects 
are loaded dynamically based on the entity’s name matching an existing, compiled class 
file.  See Figure 41 for the activities of the scenario loader.   
In this implementation, specific infrastructures are specializations of the 
Infrastructure class and are prewritten and compiled with their component Token, 
Resource and Iconnector components.  If a Token is declared in the constructor of 
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an Infrastructure that has not been previously instantiated, an exception is thrown 
indicating an illegal configuration.   
Individual actors are declared as specialization of the CompositeAgent class.  
These actors declare their component Token, IConnector, Goal, and Ticket elements 
in their constructor call.  Some of their components may reference specific Token and 
Infrastructure objects.  If these referenced objects have not been previously 
instantiated, an illegal configuration exception is thrown. 
The simulation is run as a single thread.  During each simulation cycle the agents 
are polled, and provided the opportunity to reevaluate their goals and actions.  The loop 
continues until it has executed a predetermined number of steps or is halted by the user.   










[for each infrastructure i]
instantiate actor
and components
[for each actor a]
a: Actor
t: Token[for each token t]
 
Figure 41.  Scenario loading activities for SimManager class.   
2. Entity Package 
The entity package contains the Entity class, which is the parent class of all 
entities in the simulation.  It also contains two key passive entities that are specializations 
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of the Entity class: Infrastructure and Resource.  These are passive entities 
indicating that they cannot initiate actions; rather they react to actions initiated by other 
entities.  Active entities are discussed in the actor package. 
 
Figure 42.  The entity package contains the Entity class and two specialized 
passive entities: Infrastructure and Resource. 
3. Actor Package 
The actor package contains the active entities and their component classes.  An 
active entity is an entity that the SimManager permits initiating actions.  The abstract 
Actor class is the parent of all active entities.  The CompositeAgent class extends 




Figure 43.  The main classes in the actor package are the Actor and CompositeAgent 
classes, which inherit from the Entity class. 
When an Actor’s takeTurn() method is called by the SimManager, the actor 
executes its goal selection routine, depicted in Figure 44.  Each actor loops through its 
goal set G and determines which goal to execute next.  If the next goal to execute is not 
the current executing goal, then the current goal is interrupted, resulting in that goal’s 
onInterupt() actions being executed.  
If no goal has been selected then the agent’s performNoGoal() method is 
executed, ensuring any management functions are handled on the Agent.  If a goal has 
been selected for execution then the goal executes its onExecute() actions, and the goal 
is recorded as the current activeGoal. 
Researchers may customize their own agent architecture and implement it via 
STIAM by extending the abstract Actor class and registering them with SimManager.
SimManager alerts an Actor that it may initiate actions by calling its  
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EntitytakeTurn() method.  An agent must also provide a toString() method and 
a report() method to report the agent’s status as text.  The paintComponent() 
method is called by the SimManager to force the agent to paint itself on the GUI.  The 
isPointContainedWithin() method returns a Boolean value indicating if the Point 
passed as an argument is contained within the Entity on the GUI display.  The 
getReportPanel() returns a JPanel object  representing a report of the current status of 
the actor, which is displayed in the simulation if a user clicks on the actor on the GUI as 






[activeGoal  = ∅ ]
takeTurn
nextActiveGoal : GoalactiveGoal : Goal
[nextActiveGoal = activeGoal]
[activeGoal ≠ ∅ ]
[nextActiveGoal  = ∅ ]
do no goal














Figure 45 depicts the algorithm an Agent uses to reevaluate its goals.  The Agent 
loops through each of the Goals that are currently evaluated to be critical.  The agent 












[not best goal examined]
[best goal examined]




Figure 45.  An activity diagram depicting the agent reevaluate goal routine. 
Figure 46 illustrates the relationship between roles, actors, goals, and tickets.  
CompositeAgents are assigned to roles.  Roles provide the assigned agent with a set of 
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goals.  Goals have tickets that are its procedural problem-solving step.  The frames within 
a ticket may be filled with any object that extends the Frameable abstract class: sub 
tickets, actions, or slots.  Slots contain connectors (not depicted) that allow it to 
dynamically bind to appropriate knowledge pool items at runtime.    Complex problem 
solving can be implemented through creative use of tickets.  Illustrated in Figure 46 is the 
base Ticket class.  This class is extended to a SequentialTicket that always starts in 
the first frame and executes the frames sequentially, until the last frame is executed, 
where it is flagged as completed.  The ContinualLoopSequentialTicket class 
extends the SequentialTicket class, overriding the onCompletion() method, 
















































Figure 46.  The classes of the actor package. 
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4. Connector Package 
The connector package contains all of the necessary classes for implementing 
Connector and IConnector systems.   
a. IConnectors and IBinders 
The IConnector is discussed in detail in Chapter IV.  In this 
implementation both the Socket and Plug classes are extended to include Connector, 
Listener, and Resource subclasses, where: 
• Connector: only executes Actions on other IConnector, and is 
not directly related to a Resource. 
• Listener:  passively reports on existing matching IConnectors. 
• Resource: are linked to a particular Resource within an 
Infrastructure and represents an interface to a particular 
Resource.   
 
Each IConnector is able to designate specific IConnectorAction 
objects to execute upon the IConnector connecting, disconnecting, or being interupted.  
An IConnectorAction object has the potential to modify an infrastructure’s interface.   
In this implementation, SimManager has a single instance of IBinder, 


































Figure 47.  The classes related to IConnectors in the connector package.  
 
b. Connectors and Binders 
Each CompositeAgent has a single Binder object that represents the 
actor’s inner environment.  Connector objects are implemented using the same 
architecture as Java event listeners [Horstmann and Cornell, 2000], and was first 
implemented using this technique by [Osborn, 2002].  CompositeAgent component 
objects implement the ConnectorChangeListener interface, and register with the 
Binder any Connectors that they are interested.  Connectors also register 
themselves with the Binder.  The Binder notifies registered components of matching 
Connectors when the connector extends into the Binder, change value or change 
state.  The notification occurs through a ConnectorChangeEvent which is passes to 
the ConnectorChangeListener using the connectorChanged() method.  The 
ConnectorChangeEvent object contains a reference to the Connector that is 




Figure 48.  The classes related to Connectors in the connector package. 
5. Scenarios Package 
The scenarios package contains specific scenario files in XML.  Figure 49 
depicts a sample XML scenario file.  Entities defined in a scenario file are specializations 
of base entity classes that are placed in this package, permitting SimManager to find 




Actor names must start with capital letter and must match
the class name exactly.

































Figure 49.  Sample XML scenario file. 
6. Utilities Package 
The utilities package contains the basic utilities needed for the simulation.  
This includes a clock that maintains the current simulation cycle.  Assert is a singleton 
debug class that has a single method with two arguments.  Assert prints an error 
message to the standard output and halts the application if the first argument passed in 
the method does not evaluate to true.  ReadScenario and LoadClasses are used by 
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the SimManager for reading the XML scenario files and loading classes dynamically at 
runtime.  BucketHashtable and ConnectorHashtable are all specialized data 
structures and algorithms for dealing with connectors and tickets.   
 
 
Figure 50.  Classes in the utilities package. 
C. SUMMARY 
This implementation of STIAM was as a single Java application running a single 
simulation thread.  The actors were polled, giving each an opportunity to execute actions. 
The architecture proved to be modular and robust, facilitating the testing of new 
components and ideas without extensive modification of existing code. 
The following chapters introduce several scenarios that were developed using this 
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VIII. SCENARIO IMPLEMENTATION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces several scenarios that were developed using the software 
implemented in this dissertation.  The first scenario is a demonstration of an attacker 
actor who adapts to the environment and discovers successful attack sequences that are 
not encoded in the agent.  The second scenario models system exploit propagation, and 
illustrates how STIAM can be used as a virtual laboratory to illustrate complex IA 
domains.  Combined, these scenarios provide an introduction into some of the IA 
scenarios that are possible using this implementation of the STIAM model.  By 
comparing the data obtained in the later scenario with observations in the IA field, a 
validation of the hypothesis generation capability of STIAM is provided. 
B. SCENARIO ONE – “ADAPTIVE ATTACKER” 
The implementation of this scenario has several purposes: 
• to provide a proof of principle of basic model elements, 
• to show that an actor is able to discover an attack sequence that it was not 
previously  aware when the simulation started, 
• to demonstrate how attackers adapt. 
1. Background 
The society of this scenario contains one actor and three infrastructures.  The 
single actor is called Hacker14.  The Hacker goals are to increase knowledge of computer 
systems, expand access to systems, and earn fame within the hacker community.  The 
infrastructures consist of a data library, a hacker community, and an enterprise 
infrastructure.  The library is a simple repository of information, which responds to 
queries, providing data to whomever requests it.  The hacker community is a repository 
of system vulnerabilities, providing the means to access identified systems.  The 
                                                          
14 The term Hacker, as used in this chapter, refers to “a malicious or inquisitive 
meddler who tries to discover information by poking around … possibly by deceptive or 
illegal means…” [Steele et al., 1983]. 
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enterprise is a corporate infrastructure, consisting of a critical resource called database, 
and numerous infrastructure interfaces.  One interface permits users to access the 
database resource.  Other interfaces represent means to gather information about the 
corporation, and vulnerabilities that exist on the infrastructure. 
Assumptions:  A clock cycle represents an arbitrary unit of time (though fairly 
short) corresponding to the duration of simulation events. 
2. Implementation 
The Society is defined as five types of tokens, three infrastructures, and one 
actor. 
a. Tokens 
The tokens in this scenario represent the knowledge that an actor has, or 
needs, to achieve his goals.  The tokens are: 
Token Name Initially Possessed By Description 
dbPassword enterprise This token represents the current password 
needed to access the corporate database. 
enterprise hacker This token represents the identity of a particular 
corporate enterprise. 
vuln103 hackSite An actor possessing this token has the 
knowledge required to exploit a technical 
vulnerability numbered 103. 
enterpriseService enterprise This token represents general-purpose 
information on computer processes and services 
that may be operating on an infrastructure. 
sysType enterprise This token represents technical information 
about the information technology operating in 
the infrastructure, and accessible through an 
interface. 
Table 4.  The Tokens used in Scenario One. 
b.  The Infrastructures 
There are three infrastructures.  The first is depicted in Figure 51.  It 
depicts a critical resource labeled ‘database’ that is accessible for read access if an entity 
presents an database plug with the token ‘dbPassword.’  This represents the ability to 
access a corporate information resource via a password.   
 A second interface is accessible via an enterprise plug with token 
‘enterpriseService.’  This interface represents the ability of an entity to see what 
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information services are operating on an infrastructure.  In real networks, this represents a 
means to identify what services or processes are running on nodes in a network.  To 
simplify the model, this scenario only models one service or process, which is called 
‘systype’, and knowledge of this service is represented by the token ‘systype.’  Thus, 
binding to this enterprise socket results in the entity that caused this binding to receive a 
token labeled ‘systype’, indicating that the entity now “knows the type of system running 
on the infrastructure.”  
The last interface on the enterprise infrastructure is a system vulnerability.  
Binding to this vulnerability socket requires an entity to posses token ‘vuln103’, i.e.  
knowledge of the exploit for this particular vulnerability.  Successfully binding results in 











Figure 51.  An enterprise infrastructure, with a resource, service scan, and 
vulnerability 
The second infrastructure, depicted in Figure 52, represents a traditional 
library, a source of publicly available, open-source information.  The library has one 
interface and  simple functionality.  Binding to the interface is performed through the 
library socket that requires a single token called ‘enterprise.’  Successfully binding to this 
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interface results in a token labeled ‘enterpriseService’ being transmitted to the entity on 
the other end of the plug.  This capability represent the ability of any person going to a 
public source, presenting the name of the entity, and receive public information on the 
enterprise.   
library, {enterprise}
If an Entity binds to this
socket, that Entity receives





Figure 52.  The library infrastructure, which provides information on the 
enterprise infrastructure. 
The hackerSite infrastructure is similar to the library, and is depicted in 
Figure 53.  This infrastructure represents a very simplified version of the hacker 
community, and its vulnerability-exploit sharing process.  In this infrastructure, an entity 






Figure 53.  The hackerSite infrastructure, which provides vuln103 Token if 
presented with sysType Token. 
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c. Actors  
There is one actor class, called Hacker.  The hacker begins with only one 
token, the enterprise token, indicating that the hacker has a designated target, the 
enterprise.  The hacker’s goal components are illustrated in Figure 54.  This class 
diagram shows that a hacker has three goals;  
1. Gather intelligence:  this goal is for the hacker to gather information on 
targets that it believes are important.  To achieve this goal the hacker has 
three processes:   
a. Conduct library research:  the hacker presents tokens to the library 
in the hopes that the hacker will receive important public 
information. 
b. Scan an Enterprise infrastructure:  the hacker scans an 
infrastructure, and attempts to retrieve any system data on from the 
infrastructure. 
c. Research System Vulnerabilities:  the hacker takes any system 
information it may receive and presents it to the hacker community 
in the hopes of receiving exploits against the particular systems. 
2. Expand personal powerbase:  The hacker takes exploits against a 
particular system and executes the exploits, achieving access to the inner 
workings of the penetrated infrastructure.  
3. Earn fame:  The hacker takes critical infrastructure information and the 
ability to penetrate an infrastructure, and accesses the critical resources of 
the infrastructure. 
The goals have an implied priority based on their weights.  This indicates 
that it is more important to earn fame then expand the power base, or gather intelligence.  
This is by no means a comprehensive hacker goal structure, so additional goals, tickets, 
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Figure 54.  The example hacker’s goals, tickets and actions. 
Figure 55 presents a screenshot of this scenario in execution.  In this 
implementation of STIAM, the actors are always depicted as circles, vertically along the 
left edge of the screen.  Infrastructures are depicted as ovals along the right edge.  
Resources are depicted as triangles contained within their respective infrastructures.  





Figure 55.  Screen shot of Scenario One on STIAM implementation. 
3. Experimental results of Scenario One 
a. Observations 
The sequence of key actions that occur in this scenario are listed in Table 
5.  Appendix A contains the complete list of actions that occurred in this scenario.   
The scenario begins with the actor in possession of only one token; the 
enterprise token.  The actor attempts to solve its highest priority goal that has an 





Cycle Output from simulation Explanation 
1 Hacker: hacker executing goal Goal: GatherIntelGoal
executing frame: Action: ConductLibraryResearchAction
Socket Binding -- hacker to library
Hacker: hacker received message: message:
from: 0: Infrastructure library
token: Token: enterpriseService
memo: receive information on enterprise
Hacker: hacker added token: Token: enterpriseService
The hacker accesses the 
library and requests 
information on 
enterprise, which it 




2 Hacker: hacker executing goal Goal: GatherIntelGoal
executing frame: Action: ConductLibraryResearchAction
The hacker tries the new 
enterpriseService 
token at the library, which 
fails 
3 Hacker: hacker executing goal Goal: GatherIntelGoal
executing frame: Action: ScanEnterpriseWithDataAction
Socket Binding -- hacker to enterprise
Hacker: hacker received message: message:
from: 4: Infrastructure enterprise
token: Token: sysType
memo: receive detailed information on systems
running on environment
Hacker: hacker added token: Token: sysType
The hacker tries the 
enterpriseService 
token against the 
enterprise 
infrastructure, which is 
successful, returning a new 
sysType token. 
4 Hacker: hacker executing goal Goal: GatherIntelGoal
executing frame: Action: ConductLibraryResearchAction
The hacker tries the 
sysType token at the 
library, which fails. 
5 Hacker: hacker executing goal Goal: GatherIntelGoal
executing frame: Action: ScanEnterpriseWithDataAction
The hacker tries the 
sysType token at the 
enterprise 
infrastructure, which fails. 
6 Hacker: hacker executing goal Goal: GatherIntelGoal
executing frame: Action: ResearchSysVulnAction
Socket Binding -- hacker to hackersite
Hacker: hacker received message: message:
from: 2: Infrastructure hackersite
token: Token: vuln103
memo: receive exploit for 'vuln103' on system
'systype'
Hacker: hacker added token: Token: vuln103
The hacker tries the 
sysType token at the 
hackerSite, which is 
successful, resulting in 
receiving a new vuln103  
token 
7 Hacker: hacker executing goal Goal: ExpandPowerbaseGoal
executing frame: Action: ExploitSysAction
Hacker: hacker received message: message:
from: 4: Infrastructure enterprise
token: Token: dbPassword
memo: receive password to access Resource:database
Hacker: hacker added token: Token: dbPassword
The hacker uses the 
vuln103 token on the 
enterprise 
infrastructure, which results 
in the hacker receiving a 
new token dbPassword 
8 Hacker: hacker executing goal Goal: EarnFameGoal
executing frame: Action: AccessResourceAction
** success **
Hacker uses the dbPassword 
token on the enterprise 
infrastructure and 
successfully access the 
critical resource. 




While this scenario may appears simple, it is important to understand that 
the hacker actor does not possess an explicit plan on how to access the ‘database’ 
resource prior to the run of the simulation.  Nor does the attacker generate a plan prior to 
the execution of an action.  The Actor fired the highest priority goals whose prerequisites 
were met, and discovered the sequence of steps that led to accessing the resource.  The 
actor sensed the environment that it was presented, and used its limited abilities to 
discover what works.  
Not all of the hacker’s actions were successful.  In clock intervals 2,4 and 
5 the hacker presented iconnectors to infrastructures that failed to bind.  These 
unsuccessful actions were the results of the actor attempting to solve the 
GatherIntelGoal by presenting new information tokens that it had received, to any 
intelligence source.  Cycle 2 and 4 represent the hackers unsuccessfully research of 
information at a library, and cycle 5 represents unsuccessfully research at the enterprise. 
In cycle 5 the hacker presented information tokens to the infrastructure 
that ‘obviously’ will not produce any results.  In the real world, security analysts say this 
is an indication of a script kiddie, or unskilled attacker.  Script Kiddies may try anything 
in an attempt to access information system, without understanding the underlying 
technology [The Honeypot Project, 2002].   
c.   Lessons Learned 
The actors presented in this dissertation generate plans through reactive 
interactions within the environment that they are placed.  This can be contrasted with the 
method traditional rule-based systems use to generate their plans. 
On can think of traditional rule-based systems as starting at the root of a 
search tree and generating the tree15.  A node on the tree represents a state, and a 
transition on the tree represents a subgoal or action taken by the agent.  The leaves of the 
                                                          
15   This represents a forward chaining search.  An agent could also perform a 
backward chaining search where it starts at the goal and generates the tree back toward 
the current state [Russell and Norvig, 1995]. 
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tree represent goal states.  The shape of the tree is specified and constrained by the rules 
contained within the agent.  Once the tree has been generated, the agent selects an action 
to perform that leads the agent down the tree to the desired goal.  In many domains, 
generating the entire tree may be intractable, so the agent must stop at some point and 
select an action to perform that appears promising.   
In this dissertation, an agent does not perform a search for a goal, nor 
generate a plan tree.  Rather, it selects the highest goal that has an action ready for 
execution and executes the action.  During the execution of the simulation, an implied 
search tree is created by the actions the agent selects and the goals that are achieved.  
This can be thought of as dynamically generating implied plans during runtime.   
The tree generated by the agent during runtime does have human bias.  A 
static weight is applied to the goals and tickets when they are input into the agent.  These 
weights act as a heuristic, aiding the agent in achieving goals.  The heuristics act as a 
means to prune the search tree as the agent runs through the simulation. 
The advantage of this reactive planning is that the agent is able to deal 
with unspecified environments.  Additionally, there is no time-consuming search, which 
is beneficial to real-time system.  Additionally, with the addition of weight adjustment, an 
agent could discover what works, and what doesn’t work, in never before seen 
environments, and adjust the weight of tickets appropriately. This is left for future work. 
There are several disadvantage of the reactive planning.  First, the agent 
may suffer from the effects of linear problem solving as discussed in Chapter V.  Second, 
the agent only has a local perspective, possibly resulting in the “horizon problem” 
[Russell and Norvig, 1995] where the agent commits to a path based on a local 
perspective, leading to a future unavoidable failure.  This problem may be solved by a 
look-ahead planning algorithm, but this would fundamentally change the behavior of the 
actor, and may prove detrimental to the innovative reactive plans desired.   
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C. SCENARIO TWO – WINDOW OF VULNERABILITY 
This scenario examines information system exploit propagation.  An information 
system flaw is an unspecified functionality on a particular information system that results 
from poor system design, implementation, or maintenance [Myers, 1980].  Once a flaw 
has been discovered, and there exists a potential to exploit the flaw causing undesirable 
consequences on the part of the defender, then the flaw becomes a vulnerability.  When a 
flaw has been identified, a vendor may provide a patch or other means to remove or 
mitigate the flaw or the effects of the flaw.  A vulnerability or exploit may also be 
publicized resulting in a rapid propagation of exploits throughout the society.  In addition, 
the vulnerability may become scripted, so that less sophisticated attackers, script kiddies, 
may exploit the more complex vulnerabilities without sophisticated technical knowledge.  
This sequence of actions is called the “window of vulnerability” [Arbaugh et al., 2000]. 
This section discusses the window of vulnerability.  It presents a model that 
generates the sequence of actions in a virtual society.  The results of this scenario are 
compared with the results obtained by Arbaugh et al. [2000].  This section validates the 
claim that STIAM can produce hypothesis that are comparable to what is observed in the 
IA environment. 
1. Background 
To model a widely distributed vulnerability, a larger and more complex society 
was created.   
The society contains seventeen actors:  
• two sophisticated hackers, 
• five script kiddies, 
• ten system administrators. 
 
Also, the society contains thirteen infrastructures: 
• an elite infrastructure, 
• a script kiddie infrastructure, 
• a vendor infrastructure, 




The enterprise infrastructures are a homogeneous set of infrastructures that have 
the same, single vulnerability.  There is one system administrator actor responsible for 
each enterprise infrastructure.  The system administrators have goals of discovering 
vulnerabilities and exploits against their infrastructures and keeping their infrastructures 
patched.  The vulnerability on each infrastructure will let any entity who possesses a 
special token, “vuln1” to bind to the infrastructure.  This binding is the goal of the 
attackers, and an action the defenders wish to prevent. 
In addition, this scenario models the hacker community.  An attacker is modeled 
as someone who is capable of discovering vulnerabilities and exploits, and distributing 
knowledge of these to the rest of the hacker community via hacker infrastructures.  These 
infrastructures can be accesses by less sophisticated attackers, called script kiddies, who 
can obtain these exploits.  The script kiddies are then able to exploit vulnerabilities 
without possessing the technical skill to develop the exploits themselves.  The hackers 
have a higher skill level than script kiddies, but otherwise possess identical goal and 
action sets.   
Finally, we wish to model the vendor community.  System administrators report 
to a vendor when the infrastructure for which the system administrator is responsible has 
been attacked.  The vendor creates a patch, which is published to the society, and may be 
retrieved as a token by system administrators.  The system administrators then install the 
patch on their system, resulting in the elimination of the appropriate vulnerability.   
By varying properties of the infrastructures and actors, a virtual laboratory exists 
whereby security analysts may examine the results of changes to the society and observe 
how these changes affect the society.  Results obtained from various experiments are 
presented in a later section. 
2. Implementation 











vuln1 none An actor possessing this token has the knowledge required to 
exploit the technical vulnerability on the enterprise infrastructure. 
patch1 none An actor possessing this token has the knowledge and tools to 
patch or mitigate the effects of the vuln1 vulnerability. 
notify sysadmins This token represents a message from a system administrator to a 
vendor that the system administrator’s infrastructure has been 
exploited (by vuln1). 
sysadmin enterprise 
infrastructures 
This token is used by the enterprise infrastructure to indicate that 
a message (iconnector) is designated for a system administrator 
only.  This may represent a trusted communication channel or 
confidentiality method that is used between the infrastructure and 
the administrator. 
Table 6.  The Tokens used in Scenario Two. 
b.  The Infrastructures 
The four types of infrastructures are defined as the elite, script, and vendor 
infrastructure, and multiple enterprise infrastructures. 
The elite and script infrastructures are identical in functionality and 
represent the information system used by criminal attackers.  The elite infrastructure 
accepts messages containing a token from another actor. When the message arrives, it is 
added to the infrastructure’s token set.  Additionally a socket is extended that allows any 
actor to bind who presents a plug iconnector labeled “elite”.  Binding to this socket 
results in a token being sent by message to the owner of the plug.  This socket binding 
represents the ability of anyone in the hacker elite community to bind to the elite 
infrastructure to receive any tokens possessed by the infrastructure.  Figure 56 (a) 
represents an elite infrastructure that contains a single token, “vuln1”.  The “script” 
infrastructure is identical to the “elite” infrastructure except that the socket is labeled as 
“script” rather than “elite”.  Exploits are published to elite sites first and later scripts sites, 
representing the ability of elite hackers to exploit systems earlier than the script kiddies.    
Figure 56 (b) represents the “script” infrastructure, which is identical to the elite, except 









      (a)                                                                           (b)  
Figure 56.  The elite (a) and script (b) infrastructures are identical except for the 
socket labels. 
In this scenario, there are ten nearly identical enterprise infrastructures.  
The only difference between the instantiations of the infrastructures is the enterprise label 
on a plug and socket connector.  These labels are identifies as enterprisen where n ranges 
from 1 to 10, representing the identity of the infrastructure.   
An enterprise infrastructure has a vulnerability labeled “vuln” which 
requires one token, “vuln1”, which represents the ability to exploit the vulnerability.  
Upon exploiting the vulnerability a plug is extended that has the potential to alert the 
system administrator that the infrastructure was exploited.  This represents an abstraction 
of “after-the fact” alert mechanisms, such as intrusion detection systems.  Additionally, a 
socket labeled “enterprisen, {patch1}” exists that represents the ability of a system 
administrator to patch the vulnerability.  Binding to this socket results in the vulnerability 








Figure 57.  The enterprise infrastructure has an alert plug, a vulnerability socket, 
and a patch socket.  
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The vendor infrastructure depicted in Figure 58 represents the entire 
vendor community.  The vendor infrastructure consists of a single active socket.  System 
administrators bind to this socket to notify the vendor that their systems have been 
exploited.  The first actor that binds to this socket causes the extension of another socket 
representing the availability of a patch for the vulnerability “vuln1”.  If an entity binds to 
this second socket, it will receive a message from the vendor containing the patch1 token, 







Figure 58.  The vendor infrastructure represents the entire vendor community. 
c. Actors 
As discussed earlier, hackers (elites) and script kiddies (scripts) were 
modeled identically except for higher skill value provided to elites and their ability to 
bind to their respective infrastructures.  The goal structures are presented below in Figure 
59.  Each attacker has a goal of acquiring vulnerabilities.  If a new exploit is not available 
on the hacker websites, the attacker will try to generate a new exploit.  The probability of 
an attacker generating an exploit on any simulation cycle is the skill level of the attacker; 
this value ranges from 0.0 to 1.0 for scripts, and 0.5 to 1.0 for elites. 
If an attacker discovers an exploit, in the form of a new token, the attacker 
will publish the exploit.  The first turn with the exploit the attacker will publish the 
exploit to the elite infrastructure.  The attacker will delay for a preset number of turns, 
then publish the exploit on the script website.  This represents the attackers desire to 
publish exploits to the elite site first, in order to gain fame within the hacker community.  
 134 
 
While the attacker is waiting to publish on the script site, and after it 
publishes on the script site, the attacker will use the exploit against infrastructures.  This 
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Figure 59.  The Attacker role consists of three goals: acquire, exploit, and publish 
vulnerabilities. 
The system administrator role, as depicted in Figure 60, has two goals; 
discover any exploits occurring on the system it is assigned, and patch exploits that are 
discovered.  The system administrator has a socket extended from the 
DiscoverExploitAction.  When the actor’s infrastructure is exploited, the 
infrastructure binds to this socket, notifying the actor of the exploit. This action is then 
marked as completed, and the next frame in the DiscoverExploitTicket executes, 
notifying the vendor through an iconnector that the system administrator’s infrastructure 
has been exploited.   
During each turn, the GetPatchAction extends a plug, awaiting 
notification of new patches from the vendor.  If a vendor has extended a socket 
advertising a new patch, the GetPatchAction binds, resulting in the actor receiving the 
patch through a message.  The existence of this new patch causes the 
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ApplyPatchAction to fire the next turn, resulting in the actor patching the 
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Figure 60.  The system administrator role. 
A security analyst can model proactive system administrators versus 
reactive system administrators very easily.  In its current configuration, the system 
administrator actor will bind to the vendor and patch its infrastructure as soon as a patch 
is available, representing a proactive system administrator.  This may be misleading, 
since this implementation of the system administrator does not have any other conflicting 
goals.  To cause the system administrator to be reactive, an internal connector labels 
“exploited” is placed in the system administrator actor.  The GetPatchAction can then 
be forbidden to execute until the internal connector extends.  The connector will be 




Alternatively, a reactive systems administrator could be modeled with a 
single goal and a single sequential RespondTicket.  This ticket would have discover, 
notify, receive patch, and apply patch actions placed in a sequential order. 
Future work could include more goals that conflict with a system 
administrator’s priorities, such as upgrading systems, fixing user problems, and general 
system maintenance.  This is left as future work. 
Figure 61 is a screen shot of the Window of Vulnerability scenario at the 
start of execution.  The hackers and script kiddies are represented vertically along the left 
edge.  The system administrators under the attackers, labeled “enterprise1” through 
“enterprise10”, represent the system administrators for the similarly labeled 
infrastructures.  Sockets are represented as hollow circle connector ends, and plugs are 
filled circle connector ends.  Retracted connectors are to the right of the infrastructures.  





Figure 61.  Implementation of Scenario Two. 
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3. Experimental results of Scenario Two 
Arbaugh et al. [2000] provided the first quantitative analysis of the window of 
opportunity phenomena.  They discovered that the number of incidents reported to the 
Computer Emergency Response Team Crisis Center (CERT/CC) Incident Team, when 
plotted over time, is positively skewed toward the beginning of the vulnerability 
reporting, as depicted in Figure 62.  Arbaugh et al. discovered that after an exploit is 
discovered there is a small increase in the number of exploit incidents.  This is followed 
by a tremendous jump in the number of exploit incidents as the exploits are published to 
the general community and scripts are developed for the exploits.  After patches are 
released, the number of exploits begins to drop, and continues to drop slowly, sometimes 
over a period of years, as system administrators apply patches to their systems [Arbaugh 
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Furthermore, Arbaugh et al. discovered that patches were normally available 
simultaneously to, or shortly after public disclosure of a vulnerability, i.e. before the 
largest number of reported exploits.  This can be attributed to the system’s administrators 
being unaware of, or not responsive to, installing patches and other mitigating means to 
infrastructures [Arbaugh et al., 2000].  The real catalyst for the increased of incidents 
observed is the scripting of exploits.  Scripting involves creating a tool that requires very 
little technical skill, typically facilitating an unsophisticated attacker to use more 
sophisticated means. 
Arbaugh et al. acknowledges that the data used in their analysis was not complete, 
and pointed out several reasons for this inadequacy.  STIAM, therefore, can provide a 
virtual laboratory to perform hypothesis generation, and to adjust system and actor 
parameters to observe the effects to the IA of an organization, or the society as a whole.   
a. Observations 
Seven separate sub-scenarios were implemented and analyzed.  The results 
of these simulation runs are presented. 
In the first run, the system administrator agents were encoded to react to 
their system being attacked.  These agents represent reactive system administrators who 
do not apply patches until after their systems have been attacked.  Figure 63 depicts the 
results of this scenario.  The character labels on the graph represent: 
a) Initial exploit – this represents the first time an attack is executed 
on a system. 
b) Publication of exploit on elite site – this is the first indication that 
the exploit has been published, but only to a limited community. 
c) Publication of exploit on script site – at this point the exploit has 
been scripted and has a widespread distribution. 
d) Publication of patch – here a vendor publishes a patch for the 
vulnerability and systems should begin being secured.  
Reactively applying patches results in an exploit existing in the society for 
a longer period.  Attackers are able to exploit the initial infrastructures, followed by the 
system administrators of these infrastructures discover that their systems are 
compromised and begin the process of acquiring and installing patches.  As these initial 
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infrastructures are patched, the attackers move on to other infrastructures that have not 
been patched.  This sequence continues until all of the infrastructures have been attacked 
and subsequently patched.  The result is that all (100%) of the infrastructures are 
exploited 
The constant slope of the cumulative line from turn 9 to turn 19 in Figure 
63 is caused by the constant number of attackers successfully exploiting infrastructures 
during those turns.  Additionally, the simulation provides perfect situational awareness, 
resulting in an analyst receiving all of the reports for all exploits, something not possible 
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The next example uses reactive system administrators also.  Here, the 
script is released with the elite exploit.  There is a very rapid rise in the number of attacks 
(c).  The number of attacks stays constant even after the patch (d) is published, because 
the attackers simply jump to an infrastructure that has not been attacked, and therefore 
not patched.  There is a slight decrease in the number of incidents and the lifetime of the 
exploit because the attackers are able to exploit systems quickly at the beginning of the 
lifeline, and therefore the systems administrators get a chance to patch their systems 
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Figure 64.  Reactive system administrator with accelerated publication of script and 
delayed publication of patch. 
In the next example the reactive system administrators have access to the 
patch before the script is released.  Seven infrastructures are quickly exploited, and the 
system administrators rapidly respond, patching their systems.  As systems are patched, 
other systems are exploited, causing an oscillation in the number of exploits over time.  




























Figure 65.  Reactive system administrator with patch released prior to scripts. 
In the next run, the system administrators apply patches as soon as a patch 
is available from a vendor, representing proactive system administrators.  The results are 
depicted in Figure 66.  As shown, an attacker discovers the exploit at (a).  There is a 
small increase in exploits, representing the hackers receiving the exploit after it is posted 
to the elite site, and then attacking the infrastructures (b).  Next, the script kiddies receive 
the exploit after it is posted to the script website, which causes a large increase in the 
number of exploits (c).  After a delay the vendor releases the patch (d), all system 
administrators, whether their systems have been attacked or not, request and apply the 
patch, whereby the  number of exploits drops to zero. 
In Figure 66 the vulnerability dies very quickly when compared to reactive 
scenarios.  The result is that far fewer incidents occur, and only half of the infrastructures 
were compromised. Although the vendor has a long delay in getting the patch to the 
system administrators, the initiative of the system administrators quickly makes up for 
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Figure 66.  Results with proactive system administrators with patch released after 
scripts. 
In the next run, the exploit is released to elites and scripts simultaneously 
(b)(c), as depicted in Figure 67.  The patch is published after the scripts (d).  The result is 
that, although the lifetime of the vulnerability is identical to the previous scenario, there 
is a 50% increase in the number of incidents, and all of the infrastructures are exploited, 
representing a 100% increase.  This scenario illustrates that delaying the release of scripts 




























Figure 67.  Proactive system administrators with scripts released soon after the 
elites and the before the patch. 
In this next example, Figure 68, proactive system administrators receive 
the patch for a vulnerability prior to publication of the exploit to script kiddies.  This 
represents a vendor’s ability to quickly create a patch once a vulnerability is discovered, 
or the security communities willingness to wait for a patch to be published before 
publication of exploits to the script kiddies and the general public. 
The number of exploits per turn reaches a maximum of two.  This is due to 
the fact that the exploit was published to the elites, and every elite could then exploit the 
































Figure 68.  Patch released prior to publication of exploit on script kiddie 
infrastructure for proactive system administrators. 
In this last example the number of script kiddies is increased from five to 
eleven, giving a total of 13 attackers.  In this example the attackers “out number” the 
infrastructures, so once the exploit is published there is a large number of exploits 
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Figure 69.  Society with large number of attackers than infrastructures; using 
reactive system administrators. 
b. Discussion  
The results of the scenarios presented in the section above are summarized 
in Table 7.   
The first observation, and generated hypothesis, is intuitively obvious.  
The largest contribution to securing systems in this scenario is for the system 
administrator to be proactive in “hardening” their systems, before they are attacked.  
When the systems administrator agent reacted to being attacked, it was already too late.  
First, the reactive scenarios resulted in all of the systems being exploited, an obvious 
conclusion.  Second, the system administrator agents needed to acquire the patch, and 
install the patch, which took time.  This reaction time in installing the patch resulted in 
attackers being inside a system for long periods of time.  Once the system was hardened, 
the attackers moved on.  The result is that the vulnerability timeline were very long for 
reactive system administrator scenarios. 
The second observation, and generated hypothesis, is that patched need to 
published prior to the publication of vulnerabilities and scripts to the general public.  
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Being proactive in installing patched is of no use if a large number of attackers have a 
means into a system before a patch is available.      
As supported by empirical results, “automation (of attacks) is the catalyst 
for wide spread intrusions” [Arbaugh et al., 2000].  Delaying the distribution of these 
automated exploits until a patch is published results in far fewer incidents.   
Title of Scenario Total Number of Incidents 
Lifetime of 
Vulnerability 
Number of Systems 
Exploited 
Reactive Sysadmin 
patch released  after script 102 21 100% (10/10) 
Reactive Sysadmin 
script and elites released together 
patch released after script 
94 17 100% (10/10) 
Reactive Sysadmin 
patch released before script 103 20 100% (10/10) 
Proactive Sysadmin 
patch released after script 20 8 50% 5/10) 
Proactive Sysadmin 
script and elites released together 
patch released after script 
30 8 100% (10/10) 
Proactive Sysadmin 
patch released before script 10 7 40% (4/10) 
Table 7.  Results of Window of Vulnerability Scenario 
 
Numerous factors were not included in this proof-of-principle scenario, 
and are left as future work.  Some of these factors are: 
• Collaboration among attackers who “know” each other and can share 
discovered exploits without releasing them to the general public. 
• Competition among attackers, so hackers will install a “backdoor” on 
compromised system, and then patch the vulnerability that allowed the 
attacker into the system.  The backdoor will provide later access to the system, 
and patching the system will deny the system to other hackers. 
• System administrators may shut down a system if it is compromised.  The 
system may stay “offline” until a patch exists and the system is returned to a 
safe state.  The result should be a shorter lifeline for an exploit, since attackers 
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would simply move on to other systems when a compromised system is no 
longer available.    
• Conflicting priorities for a system administrator’s time, such as maintaining 
systems, and responding to other actor’s demands.  An example of conflicting 
priorities is the system administrator’s desire to shut off a compromised 
system versus a user’s desire to perform work activities on the system. 
If a system administrator doesn’t report an attack against its systems, the 
vendor may be delayed in being notified and start working on the patch.  A way around 
this is for the vendors to monitor the hacker sites, and begin working on the patch as soon 
as the exploits are posted.  This technique works only if vendors covertly monitor hacker 
sites, and allegedly occurs within the security community.  The hacker groups try to 
defeat this technique by limiting membership and authenticating potential members 
[Taylor, 1999].  
 
c.   Lessons Learned 
Often, we wish to model the effect of time on the simulation.  Time is not 
a component of the basic STIAM model.  To consider the effects of time, a delay was 
placed on the extension and retraction of connectors.  For example, when a systems 
administrator agent binds to the vendors agent to notify the vendor of an exploit, there 
could be a delay imposed on the extension of the patch distribution sockets.  This issue is 
included in the future work section of Chapter IX. 
D.   OBSERVATIONS 
1. Model Granularity 
The decision to model individual actors and infrastructures, or aggregate them 
into relatively homogeneous entities, depends on the desires of the researcher.  Modeling 
an organization as a single individual and a single infrastructure is relatively simple, but 
may provide limited insight.  Large organizations can be modeled as sets of smaller sub 
organizations and their respective infrastructures to provide more detailed results, but this 
adds to the simulation complexity.    
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To increase the granularity of a model and simulation: 
1. deaggregate the organization into important sub organizations, including 
appropriate roles. 
2. deaggregate an infrastructure into separate infrastructures. 
3. add additional tokens as appropriate to infrastructure connectors and roles 
4. add additional connectors for the interfaces required. 
 
Figure 70 depicts a single organization and infrastructure that was deaggregated 








Figure 70.  Example deaggregated organization. 
2. Visualization of Large Societies 
As the size of societies increase, the ability to present the society in a meaningful, 
visual way decreases.  The analyst’s screen becomes cluttered, and the ability to infer 
what is occurring in real-time decreases.  This difficulty can make the analysis of the 
society very difficult, resulting in the analyst having to abandon the real-time interface 
and graphical notation of STIAM, and reverting to traditional analysis of reams of output 
or statistical analysis.   
This lack of scalability in the current implementation of STIAM can be resolved 
by implementing a ‘scenario recorder’ that records the simulation run.  This capability 
would permit the analysts to pause a simulation, and ‘rewind’ to examine what occurred 
at a particular point in time.  This ability would also allow an analyst to ‘record’ a 





This chapter demonstrates that scenarios found with the IA domain can be 
adequately simulated using a biologically based implementation of STIAM.  This 
demonstrates that implementations of STIAM can be used as virtual IA laboratories to 
investigate portions of the IA domain that may not be easily observable.  The 
observations and hypothesis generated from these scenarios are validateable with 
observations in the real environment.  
The real strength of these scenarios is as a hypothesis generator, to cause security 
analysts to go to the real environment and seek answers to confirm or deny observations 
discovered in the implementation of the STIAM model.  If an observation is confirmed, 
then these observations become theories to aid in the security analyst’s understanding of 
the complex domain of IA.  If the observations are denied, then the scenarios are adjusted 
and rerun to take into consideration elements and interaction that the researcher failed to 
consider previously.  The procedure is repeated, causing a gradual increase in 
understanding of the IA environment.   
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IX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This final chapter provides a summary of the major contributions of this 
dissertation.  While this dissertation provides contributions to the field, it also raises new 
questions.  Therefore, this chapter concludes with recommendations for future work. 
A. CONCLUSIONS  
STIAM provides a fundamental new approach to examining information 
assurance issues at an organizational level.  The computational model provides a formal 
and descriptive notation for depicting the IA environment.  Iconnectors provide a 
graphical notation that allows researchers to present the computational model in terms of 
a society in a connector notation, which aids in clarity.  Iconnectors also provide a 
mechanism to implement graphical models as computational systems, and a 
communications mechanism to facilitate inter-entity interactions.  The connector-based 
agent architecture provides researchers with composite agents constructed from relatively 
simple components that are capable of complex behavior.   
 The computational model and simulation permit researchers to select various 
levels of abstraction, and investigate particular properties in IA.  This abstraction permits 
researchers to examine specific challenges in information assurance without extensive 
modeling of hardware and software details.     
The proof-of-principle software architecture demonstrates the feasibility of this 
model.  The components of the model capture the pertinent elements of the domain, and 
allow researchers to examine equivalence classes of vulnerabilities and exploits found in 
an environment, and implement a computational model of these as case studies.  
Additionally, researchers can model the social interactions that are facilitated and 
constrained by technology.  The model simulates the challenges in the domain; such as 
the inability to discover an agent’s identity, location, means, or intent.  
The computational model and simulation of the information security domain may 
provide valuable insight into current problems, as well as discover new challenges and 




B.   RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
Due to its modular design, STIAM provides a useful test bed for examining a 
variety of issues in information assurance, social and organizational modeling, and multi-
agent system design.  Below are some of the possible areas for additional research.  
1.   Agent History 
Connector-based agents do not have an explicit history component.  Rather, an 
implied history may be stored in the agent’s tickets.  History could be embedded in a 
connector-based agent using data objects, connectors, and frame pointers that may be 
stored in tickets.  Actors could also retain a perception database to remember previous 
interactions with other agents, and the effect of actions on specific entities within the 
society.  An important research area is the effect of agent histories on the behavior of 
agents in the STIAM system. 
2. Behavior Moderators 
The behavior moderators for STIAM agents were selected through a review of IA 
literature.  A more thorough investigation of the moderators can be done, followed by 
research into how varying these values affect an agent and the society. 
3. Dynamic Role Assignment Assignments and Organizations 
In this implementation, agents are assigned roles and receive the role’s component 
goals.  A more dynamic implementation would allow actors to enter and exit roles and 
organizations throughout the simulation.   
There are latency issues is dynamic role and organization assignments.  After an 
actor leaves an organization, and the roles are broken, he still may have, or have the 
potential to have, bindings to infrastructures of that organization.  These “ghost” or 
“phantom roles” demonstrate the danger of static tokens on security. 
The duration and continuity of an organization may range from relatively static, 
such as incorporated conglomerates, to quite dynamic.  Static organizations have to deal 
with actors whose goals change over time, and thus the organizations should adapt over 
time.  Dynamic organizations force actors to adapt.  STIAM is ideal for investigating 
dynamic organizations and actors. 
 153 
 
4. Generating Tickets, Frames, and Actions at Runtime 
Ticket sets provide a limited set of options to achieve a goal.  An extension is to 
dynamically generate tickets and frames at runtime.  This could be implemented as a 
genetic algorithm that  tries new methods to achieve goals, and in effect investigates 
potentially innovative means to attack or defend entities in the pursuit of goals.  
Researchers may use this line of research to examine the coevolution of attackers and 
defenders. 
5. Agent Learning 
Agent learning was not implemented in the basic connector-based agents of 
STIAM.  Learning, or autonomously improving an actor’s behavior over time, may be 
implemented by modifying the weights to tickets and actions that have proven to be 
useful in the past, and throwing away tickets and actions that are not useful.  This would 
provide an exciting advancement to STIAM.  The basic research may result in the 
improvement of agent performance over time.  A more interesting research area is in 
manipulating agents into learning a behavior, and then exploiting that behavior. 
6. Complex Agent Goal Assignments 
The actors that were implemented in the current version of the STIAM model had 
limited goals, and as such limited opportunities for internal conflict.  More research needs 
to be conducted on the scalability of reactive, ticket-based agents and connector-based 
systems. 
7. Discretionary Access Control Policies in the STIAM Model 
In the current model, policies are static and cannot be changed by entities.  
Additionally, actors cannot grant or deny entities access to resources during execution of 
the STIAM model.  Implementing the capability to modify agent access policies and 
interfaces during runtime would provide a tremendous improvement over enumerating all 
interfaces prior to runtime.  This capability would represent a more dynamic environment 
and permit security analysts to accurately represent discretionary access control policies. 
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C.   SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the significant contributions of this dissertation.  There are 
significant areas for future work – in both extending the model, and using the model and 
implementation for gaining insight into the IA domain.  The connector-based simulation 
work provides a fruitful area of exploration, extending the insight gained from this 
dissertation into other research domains.   
Chapter VI provided a validation that the elements found in the IA domain can be 
adequately represented in STIAM.  Additionally, Chapter VIII demonstrates that an 
implementation of STIAM can generate scenarios and representable data that is found in 
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actor – a synthetic representation of IA relevant people who interact in the environment 
and are therefore represented in the society. 
agent – an active entity in the society generally representing a person or autonomous 
process. 
attack – “A series of steps taken by an attacker to achieve an unauthorized result” 
[Howard and Longstaff, 1998].   
attacker – An actor who attempts to achieve an unauthorized result16. 
authenticate – To verify the identity of a user, user device, or other entity, or the 
integrity of data stored, transmitted, or otherwise exposed to unauthorized 
modification in an information system, or to establish the validity of a 
transmission [NSTISSC, 2000]. 
availability –  “Timely, reliable access to data and information services” [NSTISSC, 
2000].  See confidentiality, integrity. 
confidentiality – “Assurance that information is not disclosed to unauthorized persons, 
processes or devices” [NSTISSC, 2000].  See integrity, availability. 
control/countermeasure – those things which are implemented to prevent exposure to 
the threat in the first place, detect if the threat has been realized against the 
system, mitigate the impact of the threat against the system, or recover/restore the 
system [Meritt, 1999] . 
denial of service – A type of incident resulting from any action or series of actions that 
prevents any part of an information system from functioning [NSTISSC, 2000]. 
distributed attack – typically has a ‘master’ who centrally controls multiple ‘zombies’ 
on compromised hosts.  At the direction of the master, the zombies perform a 
coordinated attack against a designated ‘target’ host. 
entity – any element in the set of actors, organizations, or infrastructures. 
environment – a real world situation or system being modeled.  A society is a highly 
abstract representation of a particular environment. 
exploit – Events that occur that cause undesirable consequences on the part of the victim.  
Actors possess exploits, and use these against infrastructures and other actors in 
the hope of exploiting a vulnerability. 
                                                          
16 Adapted from [Howard and Longstaff, 1998]. 
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firewall – an access control mechanism that is designed to defend against unauthorized 
access to or from a private network [NSTISSC, 2000].  
hardening system – installing patches and removing unused system services in order to 
eliminate vulnerabilities from a system. 
information assurance (IA) – “…protect(ing) and defend(ing) information and 
information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation” [NSTISSC, 2000] 
information resource – see resource. 
information warfare – “Actions taken to achieve information superiority by affecting 
adversary information, information-based processes, information systems, and 
computer-based networks while defending one’s own information, information-
based processes, information systems, and computer-based networks [DoD, 1996] 
infrastructure – the key information and information systems that exist for an 
organization. 
integrity – “…protection against unauthorized modification or destruction of data (and 
processes)”. [NSTISSC, 2000].  See confidentiality, availability. 
logical attack – refers to manipulating data in an electronic format.  See physical attack 
and social attack. 
object – A passive entity that exists in the society.  See agent. 
organization – an abstract representation of social entities that exist for a particular 
purpose. 
patch-and-penetrate – technique used in the 1970s and 1980s in the hopes of building a 
trustworthy IT system.  It consisted of patching known vulnerabilities in a system, 
then breaking into the system again, and reiterating until the engineers could no 
longer break in.   
penetration – “the successful act of bypassing the security mechanisms of the system” 
[NIST, 1988] in order to gain access past the security protection. 
physical attack – refers to the theft, destruction, and/or damage of materials.  See social 
engineering and logical attack. 
policy/security policy –  a set of rules specified by an organization that describe who 
may access a certain resource, and for what purpose. 
process – a computer program in execution [NIST, 1988]. 
protocols – A series of steps taken by two or more parties to accomplish same task. 
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resource – critical information or processes whose confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability is required for an organization to exist. 
risk – the possibly that a particular threat will adversely impact an information system by 
exploiting a particular vulnerability [NSTISSC, 2000]. 
script kiddie – “…(a person) with limited technical expertise using easy-to-operate, pre-
configured, and/or automated tools to conduct disruptive activities against 
networked systems” [Steele, 1983]. 
simulation – a method, usually involving hardware and software, for implementing a 
model to play out the represented behavior over time [NRC, 1998]. 
social engineering – using nontechnical interpersonal deception to manipulate 
individuals into providing information in order to bypass security controls.  Also 
referred to as perception management. See physical attack and logical attack. 
society – an abstract representation of the critical entities, structures, and relationships 
found in an environment.  A society is comprised of sets of organizations, 
infrastructures, and actors. 
spoof – “An active security attack in which a machine on the network masquerades as a 
different machine” [Howard and Longstaff, 1998]. 
subversion – the “covert and methodical undermining of internal and external controls 
over a system lifetime to allow unauthorized and undetected access to system resources and/or 
information.” [Myers, 1980]. 
threat – Any circumstance or event with the potential to cause harm to a system in the 
form of destruction, disclosure, modification of data and/or denial of service 
[NIST, 1988]  
token – an abstract representation of static objects that are found in the environment 
being modeled. 
Trojan horse – a small piece of malicious code hidden within an attractive legitimate 
program.    
user (end user) – an actor for whom information systems are developed. 
vulnerabilities  – a weakness in an entity allowing actions that are undesirable for 
legitimate users. 
worm – autonomous self-replicating program that spreads from one system to another 
exploiting holes in the system 
zombie – a compromised host computer that has functionality added by an attacker that 
allows the attacker (master) to control the host.  Typically, masters will send 
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APPENDIX A – EXECUTION OUTPUT 
This appendix is provided to allow a detailed analysis of the results of Scenario 
One.  It begins with the loading of the scenario into the simulation.  Next, it runs in 
chronological order, listing the goals and actions of each actor.  The output is halted after 
the attacker successfully accesses the resource on the enterprise infrastructure. 
SCENARIO ONE –ADAPTIVE ATTACKER 
//  LOADING THE SCENARIO INTO THE SIMULATION ENGINE 
creating new IBinder: environment // ibinder named ‘environment’ is created
Adding new Token: enterprise // all tokens are registered in environment
Adding new Token: enterpriseService
Adding new Token: sysType
Adding new Token: vuln103
Adding new Token: dbPassword
Adding new Token: malice
IConnector Changed -- iconnector(library) // begin constructing library infrastructure
library extended(true)
Infrastructure added: 0: Infrastructure library // library infrastructure created
IConnector Changed -- iconnector(hackerSite) // begin constructing hacker
infrastructure
hackerSite extended(true)
Infrastructure added: 2: Infrastructure hackersite// hacker infrastructure created
IConnector Changed -- iconnector(enterprise) // begin constructing enterprise
infrastructure
enterprise extended(true)
IConnector Changed -- iconnector(enterprise)
enterprise extended(true)
Adding new resource database
IConnector Changed -- iconnector(database)
database extended(true)
Infrastructure added: 4: Infrastructure enterprise// enterprise infrastructure created




Hacker: hacker added token: Token: enterprise // hacker received ‘enterprise’ token
Actor added: Hacker: hacker //hacker created
//SIMULATION BEGINS 
*** Clock time now: 1
Hacker: hacker executing goal Goal: GatherIntelGoal
executing frame: Action: ConductLibraryResearchAction
IConnector Changed -- iconnector(library)
library extended(true)
Socket Binding -- hacker to library
Hacker: hacker received message: message:
from: 0: Infrastructure library
token: Token: enterpriseService
memo: receive information on enterprise
Hacker: hacker added token: Token: enterpriseService
IConnector Changed -- iconnector(library)
library extended(false)
library disconnecting from Socket: library
*** Clock time now: 2
Hacker: hacker executing goal Goal: GatherIntelGoal
executing frame: Action: ConductLibraryResearchAction
IConnector Changed -- iconnector(library)
library extended(true)
IConnector Changed -- iconnector(library)
library extended(false)
*** Clock time now: 3
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Hacker: hacker executing goal Goal: GatherIntelGoal
executing frame: Action: ScanEnterpriseWithDataAction
IConnector Changed -- iconnector(enterprise)
enterprise extended(true)
IConnector Changed -- iconnector(enterprise)
enterprise extended(false)
IConnector Changed -- iconnector(enterprise)
enterprise extended(true)
Socket Binding -- hacker to enterprise
Hacker: hacker received message: message:
from: 4: Infrastructure enterprise
token: Token: sysType
memo: receive detailed information on systems running on environment
Hacker: hacker added token: Token: sysType
IConnector Changed -- iconnector(enterprise)
enterprise extended(false)
enterprise disconnecting from Socket: enterprise
*** Clock time now: 4
Hacker: hacker executing goal Goal: GatherIntelGoal
executing frame: Action: ConductLibraryResearchAction
IConnector Changed -- iconnector(library)
library extended(true)
IConnector Changed -- iconnector(library)
library extended(false)
*** Clock time now: 5
Hacker: hacker executing goal Goal: GatherIntelGoal
executing frame: Action: ScanEnterpriseWithDataAction
IConnector Changed -- iconnector(enterprise)
enterprise extended(true)
IConnector Changed -- iconnector(enterprise)
enterprise extended(false)
*** Clock time now: 6
Hacker: hacker executing goal Goal: GatherIntelGoal
executing frame: Action: ResearchSysVulnAction
IConnector Changed -- iconnector(hackerSite)
hackerSite extended(true)
Socket Binding -- hacker to hackersite
Hacker: hacker received message: message:
from: 2: Infrastructure hackersite
token: Token: vuln103
memo: receive exploit for 'vuln103' on system 'systype'
Hacker: hacker added token: Token: vuln103
IConnector Changed -- iconnector(hackerSite)
hackerSite extended(false)
hackerSite disconnecting from Socket: hackerSite
*** Clock time now: 7
Hacker: hacker executing goal Goal: ExpandPowerbaseGoal
executing frame: Action: ExploitSysAction
IConnector Changed -- iconnector(enterprise)
enterprise extended(true)
Socket Binding -- hacker to enterprise
Hacker: hacker received message: message:
from: 4: Infrastructure enterprise
token: Token: dbPassword
memo: receive password to access Resource:database
Hacker: hacker added token: Token: dbPassword
IConnector Changed -- iconnector(enterprise)
enterprise extended(false)
enterprise disconnecting from Socket: enterprise
*** Clock time now: 8
Hacker: hacker executing goal Goal: EarnFameGoal
executing frame: Action: AccessResourceAction
IConnector Changed -- iconnector(database)
database extended(true)
Socket Binding -- hacker to enterprise
IConnector Changed -- iconnector(database)
database extended(false)
database disconnecting from ResourceSocket: database
*** Clock time now: 9
Hacker: hacker executing goal Goal: GatherIntelGoal
executing frame: Action: ConductLibraryResearchAction




IConnector Changed -- iconnector(library)
library extended(false)
IConnector Changed -- iconnector(library)
library extended(true)




































APPENDIX B –UML QUICK REFERENCE 
This appendix summarizes the graphical notation for elements of the Unified 
Modeling Language (UML) that are used in this dissertation.  See [Rumbaugh et al., 
1999] for a comprehensive reference manual. 
 
A B




Class A "uses" Class B.
    Class A uses class B as an operation argument
     Changing B will result in changes in A.
aggregation relationship
    A form of association, where the aggregate (B) may possess an
        instance of a component (A)
    If the aggregate is destroyed the component is destroyed also.
composition relationship
  A form of aggregation, where the  aggregate (B) can not exist
      without an instance of the component (A).
  If the aggregate is destroyed the component is destroyed also.
A B
generalization relationship
"A is a specialization (child) of B"
A B realization relationshipA implements an interface B
A B
association - "navigatable"
   Class A has a connection (pointer) to B
   If the arrowhead is omitted then the association is bidirectional.
dependency
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